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FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS AFTER CARNIVAL
CRUISE. A PROPOSAL FOR
CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
Patrick J. Borchers*
Abstract" Once the object of American judicial loathing, forum selection agreements
recently have enjoyed a far more favored status. Forum selection agreements promote
certainty in commercial relationships and reduce transaction costs arising from litigation
of threshold issues such as personal jurisdiction and venue. In 1988, in Stewart Organiza-
tion, Inc. v. Ricoh, the Supreme Court confused several central issues, including whether
state or federal law governs enforcement in diversity actions, the mechanism for enforcing
forum selection agreements, and the consequences of seeking to enforce an agreement by
transferring the matter from one federal court to another. More recently, in Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, the Court enforced a clearly adhesive forum selection agree-
ment, raising the specter that such agreements will be enforced routinely against economi-
cally disadvantaged parties. Lower courts are now in disarray because of these sharp turns
and convoluted doctrine. As a solution, Professor Borchers proposes a comprehensive
federal statute that would limit enforcement of forum selection agreements to transactions
of $50,000 or more and would unify the enforcement standards and procedures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of forum selection agreements' in the United States is
an uneven one. In the last century, American courts were considera-
bly out of step with most other nations2 in their comprehensive refusal
1. A word on terminology seems appropriate at the outset. When referring to a contract that
affects the forum in which a civil action may be brought, this Article generally uses the term
"forum selection agreement." Usually, of course, the agreement is part of a larger agreement,
and thus the term "forum selection clause" is very common. See, eg., Juenger, Supreme Court
Validation ofForum-Selection Clauses, 19 WAYNE L. Rav. 49 (1972). Thus, this Article uses the
terms "forum selection clause" or "forum clause" and "forum selection agreement" or "forum
agreement" interchangeably. Other terms, such as "choice of forum clause," "choice of forum
agreement" and "choice of court clause" are also in common usage. See, eg., Farquharson,
Choice of Forum Clduses-A Brief Survey of Anglo-American Law, 3 INT'L LAW. 83 (1974);
Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States The Road to Zapata, 21 AM. J. COMP.
L. 124 (1973).
This Article uses "exclusive forum agreement" to describe an agre.-ment to litigate only in a
forum or fora, to the exclusion of any other fora. "Non-exclusive forum selection agreement"
describes an agreement to litigate in the agreed forum or fora, but not to the exclusion of any
other fora that have jurisdiction and venue. Some civilian commentators use the term
"derogation agreement" to describe exclusive forum agreements, "prorogation agreement" to
describe non-exclusive forum agreements. Se4 eg., Perillo, Selected Forum Agreements in
Western Europe, 13 AM. . COMP. L. 162, 162-65 (1964).
American courts generally employ the exclusive/non-exclusive terminology. See, eg., Sterling
Forest Assoc. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1394 (E.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd, 840 F.2d 249
(4th Cir. 1988). However, a baffling array of confusing terms are also in use. See, eg., ASM
Communications, Inc. v. Allen, 656 F. Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("mandatory" forum
agreement means an exclusive forum selection agreement; "permissive" forum agreement means
a non-exclusive forum selection agreement); Friedman v. World Transp., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 685
(N.D. Ill. 1986) ("forum selection clause" means an exclusive forum selection agreement; "venue
waiver clause" means a non-exclusive forum selection agreement).
2. See e.g., Law v. Garrett, 8 Ch. D. 26 (C.A. 1878); Glenor v. Meyer, 2 H. Bl. 603 (C.P.
1796); see also Aballi, Comparative Developments in the Law of Chofce of Forum, 1 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 178, 205 (1968) (civilian tradition of party autonomy allowed for enforcement of
forum selection clauses); Cutler, Comparative Conflicts of Law: Effectiveness of Contractual
Choice of Forum, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 97, 113, 122 (1985) (noting historical French and English
acceptance of forum selection clauses); Farquharson, supra note 1, at 38, 90 (civil law concept of
party autonomy lead to general acceptance of forum selection agreements; noting early English
acceptance of forum selection agreements); Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of a Forum:
Forum Selection Agreements
to enforce forum selection agreements.' In the middle part of this cen-
tury, however, the attitude of the federal courts, and other United
States courts, began to change dramatically. The United States
Supreme Court first recognized the right to enter into non-exclusive
forum selection agreements4 and then, in the landmark case of The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,5 a circumscribed right to enter into
"reasonable" exclusive forum agreements. Most state courts, 6 with
some notable holdouts,7 followed suit.
The reasons for this shift were laudatory. The right to litigate in
one forum or another has an economic value that parties can estimate
with reasonable accuracy.8 Unlike, for instance, a price fixing agree-
ment, an agreement to litigate in a set forum has no palpably undesir-
able effects on non-parties to the agreement;9 instead it has the
desirable consequence of simplifying the jurisdictional inquiry for
courts and litigants.10 Thus, "ancient concepts of freedom of con-
tract"II suggest that forum selection-like price, place of delivery and
quality of goods-should be the subject of bargaining in commercial
transactions. Similar considerations led the Supreme Court to validate
"Prorogation Agreement " 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 414 (noting early civil law acceptance of forum
selection agreements); Perillo, supra note 1, at 164-65 (non-exclusive forum agreements have
widespread acceptance in Western Europe; most countries also allow non-exclusive forum
agreements under some circumstances, but exclusive forum agreements are void in a minority of
jurisdictions). But see Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum. Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. RIv. 291, 309 (1988) (noting that
enforcement is not universally granted). See generally von Mehren, International Commercial
Arbitration: The Contribution of the French Jurisprudence, 46 LA. L. REv. 1045 (1986) (noting
civilian roots of the party autonomy principle).
3. See, eg., Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
4. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
5. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
6. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1087, 1095 (1989) (clear majority of states
follow Bremen as a matter of state law); see also Annotation, Validity of a Contractual Provision
Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4TH 404 (1984) (majority of
states follow a reasonableness approach).
7. Freer, supra note 6, at 1096 n.31 (approximately 12 states adhere to a rule of presumptive
invalidity).
8. See Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990); see also
Juenger, supra note 1, at 50 ("[A] quid pro quo can be exacted for the willingness to meet the
other party on its home ground.").
9. Northwestern Nat'l, 916 F.2d at 375-76 (but noting that in certain hypothetical cases the
courts of a certain jurisdiction could become overloaded by a large number of such agreements).
10. See Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 19, 101-03 (1990) (noting
confused and complex jurisdictional doctrine); Juenger, supra note 1, at 50.
11. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
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a negotiated exclusive forum selection agreement between commercial
traders in Bremen. 12
The desirability of an unrestrained market, however, is limited.
Contract law has long recognized that certain classes of contracting
parties, because of unequal bargaining power, lack of information and
resources, or other factors, ought not be subjected to the full load that
an unrestrained market would have them bear." But the Bremen rule,
like rules followed in many other countries,14 seemed to take that into
account. Bremen, for instance, recognized that forum selection agree-
ments wrought at the hands of "overweening bargaining power"
would not be enforced."
All was not perfect, of course, in a post-Bremen world. Because
Bremen was an admiralty case, there was a serious question as to
whether its standards were limited to that context, or were applicable
to federal question and diversity actions as well.16 Moreover, the
Bremen rule's inherent uncertainty as to what constituted a reasonable
agreement led to uneven application and enforcement, thereby relin-
quishing some of the gain made towards determinacy in allowing
forum selection to become a subject of bargaining.17 Additionally,
vestiges of judicial hostility towards forum selection agreements led
courts to interpret some statutes to preclude such agreements for cer-
tain contracts.
18
12. Id. at 1.
13. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971) (form
contract purporting to require an unsophisticated filling station operator to indemnify and hold
harmless a large oil company for the oil company's negligence is unenforceable); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTS § 208 comments a, c, d, illustrations 1, 2 (1981).
14. See generally Perillo, supra note 1.
15. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
16. See Juenger, supra note 1, at 58-59; Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law,
Federal Common Law, Federal Courts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 387 (1973).
17. See infra notes 280-93 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Hughes Drilling Fluids v. M/V Luo Fu Shan, 852 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989) (Carriage of Goods by Sea Aces (COGSA) limitation of liability
provision voids forum selection agreements); Conklin & Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d
1441 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); Union Ins. Soc'y of Canton, Ltd. v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th
Cir. 1981) (same); Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (en banc)
(COGSA voids forum selection agreement if designated forum is foreign); cf North River Ins.
Co. v. Fed Sea/Fed Pa Line, 647 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982)
(COOSA does not void forum selection agreements if COGSA is incorporated into the contract
voluntarily); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co., 492 F.2d 1294 (1st
Cir. 1974) (COGSA voids forum selection agreement if designated forum is foreign or is
unreasonable); Roach v. Hapag-Lloyd, A.G., 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D Cal. 1973) (COGSA does
not void forum selection clause). See generally Black, The Bremen, COGSA and the Problem of
Conflicting Interpretation, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 365 (1973); Waters, The Enforceability of
Forum Selection Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading: An Update, 15 rUL. MAR. L.J. 29 (1990);
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On two recent occasions the Supreme Court has revisited this topic.
In Stewart Organization, Ina v. Ricoh Corp.,19 the Court had an
opportunity to decide whether the Bremen rule applied in all federal
court cases. The Court instead confused the choice-of-law issue and
created a whole new set of unresolved problems.2" Even more
recently, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,2 the Court com-
pletely reversed direction from the pre-Bremen days and enforced an
apparent22 forum selection agreement that would have been void as
adhesive even under the laws of nations with a long history of favor
towards such agreements. 23 Thus, instead of becoming more clear in
recent years, the American law of forum selection agreements is
becoming more muddy. Worse yet, the Court's most recent pro-
nouncement holds the promise of turning forum selection agreements
from instruments of freedom to instruments of economic oppression.
Clearly, something must be done.
This Article proposes a comprehensive federal statute applicable in
all federal court cases. This proposed statute, set forth in full as an
appendix to this Article, aims both to clarify the law of forum selec-
tion agreements in the federal courts and to strike a fair balance by
drawing on other legislative efforts. Part I of this Article traces the
historical origins of the law relating to forum selection agreements and
discusses the Supreme Court's recent case law and its implications.
Williams, Forum Selection Clauses= Where They Are-Where They Are Going, 6 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 1, 13-14 (1983) (criticizing the Indussa rule); Note, Forum Selection in Maritime Bills of
Lading Under COGSA, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 459 (1989); Annotation, Validity or
Enforceability, Under Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, of Clauses in Bill of Lading or Shipping
Contract as to Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts or Applicability of Foreign Law, 2 A.L.R. FED. 963
(1969).
19. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
20. See Mullenix, supra note 2, at 334-55 (discussing issues left in the wake of Stewart).
21. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
22. See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
23. See, eg., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (MeKinney 1989) (clauses enforceable if
transaction is more than one million dollars); Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, art. 15, 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
299) 32 (1972), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1972), amended by The Convention on Accession to
the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Oct. 9, 1978, 21 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 304) (1978), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 8 (1979)
[hereinafter Brussels Convention] (clauses unenforceable in consumer contracts); Perillo, supra
note 1, at 165 (Italian civil code would not allow for enforcement of an exclusive forum
agreement in a contract of adhesion without separate acknowledgement of the clause); Reese, A
Proposed Uniform Choice of Forum Act, 5 COLUM. J. TRANS NAT'L L. 193, 197 (1966) (noting
general refusal of U.S. courts to enforce adhesive forum selection agreements); Schwind,
Derogation Clauses in Latin-American Law, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 167, 169 (1964) (noting
reluctance of Brazilian courts to enforce clauses in relatively small contracts selecting a forum a
long distance from that of the economically weaker party).
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Part II catalogues the areas of uncertainty left in the wake of current
doctrine. Part III discusses the desirability of legislative action, the
various legislative efforts, and how the proposed statute will promote
the goals of certainty and fairness.
II. FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS IN AMERICAN
COURTS
A. The Fall of the "Ouster" Doctrine
The history of forum selection agreements has been told extensively
elsewhere,24 and need not be retold at length here. As of 1950 a com-
mentator could report that "[w]ith almost boring unanimity American
courts have refused to enforce contractual provisions conferring exclu-
sive jurisdiction in advance on a court or courts of a particular sister
state or foreign country."2 The rhetorical device used to justify this
rule was that such agreements effect an invalid "ouster" of the court's
jurisdiction.26 Although Robert Leflar listed ouster among the "tradi-
tional thought-precluding sets of senseless words,"27 he also recog-
nized that it had a practical origin in times when judges were paid by
the case.28
Although a much more extensive listing is possible, a few citations
suffice to make the point that American hostility towards forum selec-
tion agreements was ubiquitous. The United States Supreme Court
case most often cited to reflect this hostility, Insurance Co. v. Morse,2 9
did not involve a traditional forum selection agreement. At issue in
Morse was the validity of a Wisconsin statute that purported to require
insurance companies to agree not to remove cases to federal court as a
condition of doing business in the state.3" Although the Court stated
24. See, eg., Farquharson, supra note 1, at 88-95; Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in
International and Interstate Contracts, 65 KY. L.J. 1, 24 (1976); Gruson, Forum-Selection
Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial Agreement.% 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133,
140-41; Juenger, supra note 1, at 50-56; Nadelmann, supra note 1, at 127-32.
25. Note, Agreements in Advance Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction on Foreign Courts, 10 LA.
L. REv. 293, 293 (1950) [hereinafter Note, Agreements in Advance]; see also Note, Validity of
Contractual Stipulation Giving Exclusive Jurisdiction to the Courts of One State 45 YALE L.J.
1150, 1152 (1936) (noting American refusal to enforce exclusive forum selection agreements but
urging a "frank recognition that such stipulations are no longer contrary to public policy").
26. See Juenger, supra note 1, at 53.
27. Leflar, The Bremen and the Model Choice of Forum Act, 6 VmiD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375,
376 (1973).
28. Id, at 384; see also Juenger, supra note 1, at 51 ("It has been surmised that judicial
hostility directed at private agreements waiving jurisdiction can be traced to England, where
financial considerations might have inspired the courts to insist on their prerogatives.").
29. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
30. Id. at 453.
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that "agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction con-
ferred by law are illegal and void,""a the traditional "non-discrimina-
tion" justification for diversity jurisdiction was heavy on the Court's
mind.32
Some of the cases that Morse cited did, however, involve traditional
forum selection agreements. For instance, in Nute v. Hamilton
Mutual Insurance Co., 33 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
invalidated a provision in an insurance contract designating the Mas-
sachusetts courts to hear any disputes between the parties. By the
turn of the century, ouster had become a regular incantation for
United States courts.34
Exactly when the first cracks in the ouster edifice appeared is hard
to pinpoint. The appearance of arbitration statutes, the major prop for
English acceptance of forum selection agreements, 35 cut the concep-
tual legs out from underneath the ouster doctrine; like forum selection
agreements, arbitration agreements oust the jurisdiction of regular
tribunals. 36 What the Supreme Court saw as a boggling conceptual
matter in Morse, Congress saw as a straightforward matter in 1925
when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).37 Instead of wor-
rying about theoretical constructs like ouster, the FAA simply pro-
vided that "[a] written provision . . . to settle by arbitration a
controversy.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable ....
Some further crumbling occurred in the Second Circuit's opinion in
Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.AS. 39 and Wm. H.
Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line, Ltd.' In both of these cases
the Second Circuit gave effect to exclusive forum selection agreements;
although the court purported to adhere to the ouster doctrine, the
import of both decisions was to give effect to reasonable agreements.
The Fifth Circuit held steady, however, refusing to give effect to forum
31. Id at 451.
32. See aL at 454-55.
33. 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856).
34. Juenger, supra note 1, at 52.
35. See Denning, Choice of Forum Clauses in Bills of Lading, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 17, 19
(1970); Note, Agreements in Advance, supra note 25, at 293.
36. Juenger, supra note 1, at 53 ("If a court wonld yield to a private agreement requiring the
parties to seek justice before the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission... why not defer to the courts of a sister state?").
37. The current version is at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988).
38. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
39. 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951); see also Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d
Cir.) (Hand, ., concurring), cerL denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949) (reasonable forum selection
agreements are enforceable).
40. 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
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selection clauses under any circumstances in Carbon Black Export,
Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa It The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Carbon Black, presumably to resolve the conflict between the Second
and Fifth Circuits. But, over dissent, the Court dismissed the writ,
concluding that the clause at issue was not broad enough to cover an
in rem action.42 Several years later in Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg4"
the Second Circuit went en banc to overrule Muller, at least in the
context of actions governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA), reasoning that COGSA's "limitation of liability" provi-
sion 44 precluded forum selection agreements in contracts governed by
that Act. Whether Indussa overruled Muller for all purposes, or just
in the COGSA context, was an uncertain matter.4"
Despite this fitful start at the circuit level, real change was not far
off. In National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,46 the Supreme
Court held that a contract entered into by Michigan farmers to
appoint a New York agent for service of process was valid and had the
effect of conferring jurisdiction on the New York federal district
court.47 In effect, the Court recognized the validity of non-exclusive
forum selection agreements, concluding that it was "settled ... that
parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction
of a given court."4
Although some commentators read National Equipment as a whole-
sale rejection of prior American practice,49 lower courts were not so
sure. In Bremen, the Fifth Circuit, firs-t in a panel decision,1° and then
en banc, 1 adhered to the Carbon Black rule of per se invalidity of
exclusive forum selection agreements.
41. 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
42. Carbor Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 359 U.S. 180, 184-86 (1959) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
43. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (en banc).
44. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1988).
45. In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 446 F.2d 907, 910 n.7 (5th Cir. 1971) (en bane)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting) (arguing that the general rationale of Muller survived Indussa), vacated
sub nom. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
46. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
47. Id at 315-16.
48. Id.
49. See, eg., Reese, supra note 23, at 194. But see Mullenix, supra note 2, at 307 (National
Equipment is dubious support for this proposition).
50. In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on rehearing, 446
F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972).
51. In re Unterweser Reederei, GmbH, 446 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1971) (en bane) (although
over the dissent of six judges led by John Minor Wisdom), vacated sub nom. The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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In an opinion notable not only for its result, but also its refreshingly
cosmopolitan tone,52 Chief Justice Burger, writing for eight Justices of
the Supreme Court, reversed.5 3 Bremen involved a contract between
Zapata, a Texas corporation, and Unterweser, a German company.
5 4
The contract called for Unterweser to tow Zapata's oil rig, the Chap-
arral, from the Gulf of Mexico to the Adriatic Sea.55 Using the deep
sea tug The Bremen, Unterweser began the towing operation, but soon
hit heavy weather and rough seas.56 With the Chaparral severely
damaged, Unterweser asked Zapata for instructions and complied
with the response by towing the rig to Tampa, Florida, the nearest
port of refuge, and, unfortunately for Unterweser, located in the Fifth
Circuit.57
The contract between Unterweser and Zapata contained an exclu-
sive forum selection clause providing that" '[a]ny dispute arising must
be treated before the London Court of Justice.' ",5s Apparently confi-
dent that the Fifth Circuit courts would ignore the clause and follow
Carbon Black Zapata attached The Bremen, and proceeded against
the tug in rem, and Unterweser in personam, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida. 9 Invoking the forum
clause, Unterweser and The Bremen moved to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds, and initiated a parallel action in the English
courts.6°
The English court refused to grant Zapata's motion to dismiss, rea-
soning that the forum clause gave it jurisdiction.6" Back in the United
States, however, the district court refused to enforce the forum clause
on the authority of Carbon Black and, as noted above, the Fifth Cir-
cuit followed suit.62 The approach of the lower courts, according to
the Supreme Court, was far too parochial. The Chief Justice reasoned
that "[t]he expansion of American business . . . will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist.., that all
52. Becker, The Chaparral/Bremen Litigation: Two Commentaries: Forum Selection Clauses
and Anglo-American Unity, 22 IN'L & COMP. L.Q. 329, 329 (1973) (Bremen is "a remarkable
internationalist declaration").
53. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 4. Florida is now, of course, in the Eleventh Circuit, but this was before the split of
the Fifth Circuit.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id.
61. Id. at4n.4.
62. Id. at 6-7.
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disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. ''63 Taking
special issue with the Fifth Circuit authority, the Court noted that
"the absolute aspects of the doctrine of the Carbon Black case have
little place and would be a heavy hand indeed on the future develop-
ment of international commercial dealings by Americans."'6
Turning to more abstract matters, the Court held that exclusive
forum agreements were "merely the other side of the" non-exclusive
forum agreements approved in National Equipment.61 As for the
ouster doctrine, the Court relegated it to the status of "vestigial legal
fiction."' 66 Forum selection agreements accord with "ancient concepts
of freedom of contract" and had obtained scholarly acceptance and a
qualified endorsement from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws. 67
To be sure, the Court did not say that every forum selection agree-
ment merited enforcement. An agreement affected by "fraud, undue
influence, or overweening bargaining power" should be voided.68 In a
more general sense, an agreement might be "unreasonable and
unjust," 69 for instance "an agreement between two Americans to
resolve their essentially local disputes in a remote alien forum."7 Any
successful attack on a forum selection clause, however, the Court cau-
tioned, would require a "strong showing."71
In remanding to the district court for further consideration, the
Court noted that it could find nothing to suggest that the forum selec-
tion agreement before it did not merit enforcement. 72 The contract
was between sophisticated entities and was "freely negotiated."7 " The
English courts were neutral and English admiralty justice enjoys a
favorable international reputation.74 Any "inconvenience" was noth-
ing that Zapata could not have anticipated at the ime that it entered
into the contract, and certainly was not enough to deprive Zapata of
its day in court.75
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id.
65. MeL at 10.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 12, 15.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 17.
71. Id at 15.
72. Id at 15-17.
73. Id at 17.
74. Id
75. Id at 18.
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Of course, Bremen did not answer all conceivable questions on
American acceptance of forum selection agreements. Whether it
applied only in international admiralty cases, or whether it had appli-
cation in other cases in federal courts, remained in doubt.76 What
would suffice for a strong showing of unreasonableness was necessarily
an open question. Whether the Supreme Court's reasoning would
carry the moral force to persuade state courts to follow its lead was
unclear. But for all of this, Bremen was clearly the major stepping
stone towards a more enlightened American approach.
B. After Bremen
The most obvious effect of Bremen was on lower courts. Federal
courts were, of course, required to adhere to its principles, at least
where they applied. Moreover, state courts generally followed the
Supreme Court's lead and reversed their hostility to forum selection
agreements. 77 But, before turning to these matters, Bremen's effect on
the further development of "consensual adjudicatory procedure ' 78 on
two different fronts requires examination.
L Extension of the Federal Arbitration Act's Reach
One front was the expansion of the reach of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA). In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,79 the Supreme Court
held that an agreement requiring arbitration before a French panel
could be enforced in an action alleging violations of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.80 Referring to arbitration agree-
ments as "a specialized kind of forum-selection clause,"81 and relying
on Bremen,82 the Supreme Court held the agreement enforceable. In
so doing, the Court severely confined Wilko v. Swan,83 thought until
then to prohibit arbitration of securities matters.84
76. See infra notes 198-221 and accompanying text.
77. See, eg., Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d
1206, 131 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1976) (adopting Bremen principles as a matter of state law).
78. See Mullenix, supra note 2, at 308 (adopting the term "consensual adjudicatory
procedure" to encompass both arbitration and forum selection agreements).
79. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
80. Id. at 509 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
81. Id. at 519.
82. Id. at 518 (citing The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)).
83. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
84. See, eg., Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate" An Examination of the Public
Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 516-21 (1981).
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A decade later, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soer Chrysler-Plym-
outh, Inc., 85 the Court extended the reach of the FAA to international
antitrust matters, which, like securities matters, were once thought to
be a "forbidden zone" for arbitration.86 Relying again on Bremen, the
Court recited the formula recognizing a "strong prisumption in favor
of enforcement of freely negotiated contractual cho.ce-of-forum provi-
sions."87 Also important to the Court was the United States' acces-
sion in 1970 to the Convention on the International Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.8" The Court's holding was
also based on a strong sense of the importance of party autonomy.
Rejecting arguments that external policies inherent in antitrust laws
made such disputes inappropriate for arbitration, the Court reasoned
that "the antitrust cause of action remains at all times under the con-
trol of the individual litigant; no citizen is under an obligation to
bring an antitrust suit, and the private antitrust plaintiff needs no exec-
utive or judicial approval before settling one." 9
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,' the Court
expanded the FAA's domain to include domestic securities disputes as
well as actions arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).91 In light of the Court's earlier pro-
nouncements, the extension to RICO matters and purely domestic
securities disputes was not surprising. The more telling development
in McMahon, however, was the Court's unflincdng willingness to
enforce an arbitration agreement contained in a form agreement
signed by two individual customers.92 Such a form agreement between
an individual investor and a large investment broker was a far cry
from the "freely negotiated" agreements hailed in Bremen, Scherk and
Mitsubishi. Even so, the Court declined to ascribe: much importance
85. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
86. Se4 eg., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968).
87. Mitsubishi 473 U.S. at 631.
88. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (implemented in the United States by
9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1988)). See generally Note, Resisting Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards Under Article V(1)(e) and Article VI of the New York Convention: A Proposal for Effective
Guidelines, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1990) (New York Convention adopted by at least 82
countries).
89. Mitsubish 473 U.S. at 636 (citation omitted).
90. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
91. Id. at 222.
92. Id. at 223.
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to the inequality of bargaining power, reasoning tersely that "[t]he vol-
untariness of the agreement is irrelevant to this inquiry."93
The Court's increasingly broad acceptance of arbitration clauses has
continued steadily. In Rodriguez de QuiFas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc.,94 the Court finally overruled Wilko expressly, and
enforced yet another form agreement signed by individual customers
of a large securities broker. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,95 the Court enforced a form agreement signed by an employee
of a securities broker requiring arbitration of a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
96
Viewed from a broader perspective, the interplay between arbitra-
tion agreements and traditional forum selection clauses seems
inverted. In England, for instance, it was the passage of arbitration
statutes that reversed the hostility towards traditional forum selection
clauses. 97 In the United States, on the other hand, the FAA antedated
acceptance of traditional forum selection clauses by nearly half a cen-
tury, and that acceptance then spurred on an expanded reading of the
FAA. Even so, the significant interrelationship between arbitration
and traditional forum selection is apparent both in the United States
and in other countries.
2. Federal Court Forum Selection Clauses
The other front on which Bremen battles have been fought in the
Supreme Court is traditional forum selection clauses. As noted
above,98 Bremen left many important questions unanswered. On two
recent occasions, in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.99 and
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 1o the Court has addressed federal
court forum selection clauses. In both cases, however, the Court has
been more forthcoming with questions than answers.
93. Id. at 230.
94. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
95. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
96. In order to get to this result, the Court was required to give an extraordinarily narrow
interpretation to the FAA's categorical exclusion for agreements in "contracts of employment."
Id. at 1651 n.2 (discussing 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)); see also infra note 331.
97. See Denning, supra note 35, at 19; Note, Agreements in Advance, supra note 25, at 293.
98. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
99. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
100. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
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a. The Stewart Decision
Stewart was a diversity case brought in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama.1"1 The defendant, a New
York manufacturer of copiers, and the plaintiff, an Alabama marketer
of the copiers, were parties to an exclusive forum selection agreement
that pointed to either the Southern District of New York or the New
York state court sitting in Manhattan. 10 2 The plaintiff filed a multiple
claim action against the defendant in the Northern District of Ala-
bama, and the defendant responded with a motion to enforce the
agreement by transferring the action to the Southern District of New
York."°3 The district court denied the motion, concluding that under
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins" it was required to apply Alabama state
law to determine the enforceability of the agreement. 105 Because Ala-
bama is one of the few states to adhere to the ouster doctrine,"0 6 the
district court denied the motion."17
The Eleventh Circuit, first in a panel decision'018 and then en
banc, 0 9 reversed. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Bremen
principles trumped state law in diversity cases. I1 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, apparently to settle the question of Bremen's appli-
cability outside of the admiralty context.
The Court, however, charted quite a different course. The Court
began with the surprising assertion that Bremen had no central place
in resolving the issue before it."' Instead, the majority reasoned,
Bremen was merely "instructive" as to a general federal policy favor-
ing forum selection clauses. 1 2 The correct approach, by the Court's
reckoning, was to begin with 28 U.S.C. § 1404,113 one of the statutes
101. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
102. Id. at 24 n.1.
103. Id. at 24.
104. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
105. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
106. See, eg., Keelean v. Central Bank, 544 So. 2d 153 (Ala. 1989); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v.
Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1980); see also supra notes 25-34.
107. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
108. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, reh g granted, vacated, 785 F.2d 896
(11th Cir. 1986).
109. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd 487
U.S. 22 (1988).
110. Id.
11. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28-29.
112. Id. at 28.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988) provides:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court




giving transfer authority to district courts. 114 In making a transfer
decision, section 1404 calls on district courts to evaluate a large
number of factors, including party convenience, witness convenience
and access to crucial evidence.11 The section 1404 balance, the Court
concluded, must also take account of "the parties' private expression
of their venue preferences."' 1 6 This, however, was a much different
approach than Bremen, which required enforcement absent substantial
countervailing considerations. 711 In the transfer context after Stewart,
although a forum selection agreement is "a significant factor" ' in
the district court's decision, it is only one of many factors and may be
overcome by other considerations.' 19 Because section 1404 is
undoubtedly constitutional, concluded the Court, it overrides state
law.12 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor "concur[red] in
full," but wrote separately to say that Bremen's "reasoning applies
with much force to federal courts sitting in diversity."' 21
Justice Scalia dissented, disagreeing with the majority on two
points.'22 First, Scalia concluded that section 1404 is not broad
enough to take account of forum selection clauses. 2 ' According to
Scalia, had Congress meant to preempt "state contract law," Congress
would have done so explicitly, as it did in the FAA.'24 Second,
because in Scalia's view section 1404 was not broad enough to regulate
the issue of forum selection agreement validity, the Rules of Decision
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit or proceeding of a
civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the discretion of the
court, from the division in which pending to any other division in the same district.
Transfer of proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf of the United States may be
transferred under this section without the consent of the United States where all other
parties request transfer.
(c) A district court may order any civil action to be tried at any place within the division in
which it is pending.
(d) As used in this section, "district court" includes the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone; and "district" includes the territorial jurisdiction of that
court.
114. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29.
115. Id at 29-30.
116. Id at 30.
117. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
118. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29.
119. Id at 29-30.
120. Id at 31-32.
121. Id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
122. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Id at 36-37.
124. Id. at 36.
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Act 12 5 as interpreted in Erie 126 must govern the choice of whether to
apply state or federal law.127 Erie, Scalia concluded, required applica-
tion of state law because of the potential for intrastate forum shopping
engendered by application of different rules in the state and federal
courts.1 28 Thus, Scalia would have affirmed the district court's denial
of the transfer motion.
In several respects, Stewart failed to clarify the Court's position on
forum selection agreements. 12 9 First, Stewart did not settle the ques-
tion of whether state or federal law applies if a party in a non-admi-
ralty case attempts to enforce the forum selection agreement by some
means other than a transfer motion under section 1404. Once the
Stewart majority concluded that section 1404 was broad enough to
take account of forum selection agreements, its conclusion that section
1404 does not overstep congressional authority was so unexceptional
that it shed little light on the choice between state and federal law
outside this context.
Second, Stewart left unanswered the correct route to enforcement of
a forum selection clause. In Bremen, Unterweser made a forum non
conveniens motion. 130 Stewart, by allowing a section 1404 motion,
appeared to endorse the position that such agreements are a matter of
venue. Other courts have considered, and continue to consider, such
agreements as regulating jurisdiction.' Although this may seem to
be a trivial point, it is not without its practical consequences.
132
Third, Stewart created the bizarre dichotomy that if an agreement is
enforced by a transfer motion-the most efficient and sensible route if
125. 28 U.s.c. § 1652 (1988).
126. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 39.
129. For a comprehensive analysis of Stewart see, e.g., Freer, supra note 6, at 1113-20;
Mullenix, supra note 2, at 332-39; Comment, Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp- Judicial
Discretion in Forum Selection, 41 RuTGERS L. REV. 1379 (1989); Note, The Enforceability of
Forum-Selection Clauses After Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 6 ALAsKA L.
REv. 175 (1989); Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie Purposes, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1068 (1989); Note, Forum Selection Clauses Designating Foreign Courts: Does
Federal or State Law Govern Enforceability in Diversity Cases? A Question Left Open by Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307 (1989); Note, Forum Selection
Clauses in Light of the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh
Corp., 72 MINN. L. RPv. 1090 (1988) (discussing Eleventh Circuit's en banc opinion in Stewart);
Note, Forum-Selection Clauses: Should State or Federal Law Determine Validity in Diversity
Actions?-Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 64 WASH. L. REv. 439 (1989).
130. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
131. See Mullenix, supra note 2, at 322-27.
132. See infra notes 269-78 and accompanying text.
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the selected forum is another federal court-the agreement is entitled
to less weight than it would be if enforced in some other way. A corol-
lary to this is that if the selected forum is a foreign court or a state
court, Stewart does not apply at all because a transfer motion is
unavailable. Thus, assuming that Bremen applies in all federal court
cases, forum selection agreements have more force in international dis-
putes than they do in most domestic matters.
b. The Carnival Cruise Case
Even more recently, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,133 the
Court did nothing to help the confused state of affairs. The Carnival
Cruise plaintiffs, Eulala and Russel Shute, purchased tickets for a
seven-day cruise aboard The Tropicale, a passenger ship owned by
defendant Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. (Carnival). l"4 The Shutes paid
for their cruise through a travel agent in their home state of Washing-
ton. 135 The payment was forwarded to Carnival's offices in Miami,
Florida; Carnival then prepared the tickets and mailed them to the
Shutes' Washington address.
136
The Shutes boarded The Tropicale in Los Angeles.137 During a
ship-sponsored tour, while The Tropicale was in international waters,
Mrs. Shute slipped and was injured.138 The Shutes then filed suit in
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington,
invoking the court's admiralty jurisdiction.139 The district court dis-
missed the case reasoning that jurisdiction over Carnival was unconsti-
tutional because of the lack of contacts between Carnival and the State
of Washington. The court did not reach the question of whether the
exclusive forum selection clause on the back of the ticket pointing to
the Florida state and federal courts was enforceable. 1"
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth
Circuit found sufficient contacts with Washington to allow for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction and held that the clause was unen-
forceable.141 The court refused to extend Bremen to cover adhesive
133. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).







141. Id. at 1524-25.
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contracts. 142 The Supreme Court granted certiorzxi on both issues,
leading to confident speculation that Carnival Cruise would produce
yet another "minimum contacts" opinion.' 43
Such speculation, although not unfounded, turned out to be wrong.
The Supreme Court confined itself to the issue of the validity of the
forum selection agreement, refusing to address the :minimum contacts
issue."4 The majority saw the validity of the forum selection agree-
ment as turning on three separate issues. First, did the Shutes have
"notice" of the provision? 45 Second, assuming that they had notice,
was the agreement enforceable under the Bremen standards?'46 Third,
did the forum selection agreement conflict with the Limitation of Ves-
sel Owner's Liability Act? 47
The Court disposed of the first issue quickly. Justice Blackmun
concluded that plaintiffs' brief had conceded the notice issue.'48 Thus,
the majority turned immediately to the validity of the agreement
under the Bremen standards.
On the question of enforceability, the Court rejected the position of
the Shutes and the Ninth Circuit that Bremen applies only in cases in
which the terms of the contract are the subject of actual negotiation.' 49
"Routine" transactions such as the Shutes' purchase of the cruise, the
Court reasoned, are not normally subject to give-and-take bargaining.
Similarly, the parties do not bargain for forum selection clauses that
spring from such routine transactions. 50 "Common sense," according
to the majority, dictated that enforcement of form contracts must be
possible without showing actual bargaining.
15 1
142. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 863 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1988), modified, 897 F.2d 377
(9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
143. Woods, Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute. An Amicus Inquiry into the Future of
"Purposeful Availment," 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1393, 1393, 1401 (1990) (predicting that Carnival
Cruise would produce a watershed opinion "addressing the constitutional aspects of American
civil procedure;" "It seems highly unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will decide
[Carnival Cruise] on the ground that the Shutes voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Florida Courts.").
144. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. CL 1522 (1991).
145. Id. at 1525.
146. Id. at 1526.
147. Id. at 1528 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988)).
148. Id. at 1525 (citing Brief for Respondent at 26) (Justice Blackmun's conclusion in
Carnival Cruise is reminiscent of Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408 (1984), a jurisdictional case in which the Court, led by Justice Blackmun, concluded that
plaintiffs' counsel had conceded the crucial issue).





The Bremen reasonableness test, therefore, had to be "refine[d] ...
to account for the realities of form passage contracts."' 52 Three fac-
tors led the Court to conclude that the clause was reasonable under
the circumstances. First, the cruise line "has a special interest in limit-
ing the fora in which it potentially could be subject to suit . . .
[because] it is not unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the
cruise line to litigation in several different fora."'5 3 Second, the clause
simplified the jurisdictional inquiry.'54 Third, "it stands to reason that
passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at
issue... benefit in the form of reduced fares ....
Turning to the third issue, the majority held that the agreement was
not statutorily prohibited. The relevant statute, 56 the Court con-
cluded, prohibited only formal limitations on access to a "court of
competent jurisdiction."'5 7 Unlike a damage limitation or hold harm-
less clause, a forum selection clause still provides for a theoretical
right of access to process.
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, took issue
with the majority on several points. First, Stevens disagreed with the
majority on the notice issue.' 58 Stevens, who reproduced the entire
ticket in its actual size as an appendix to his dissent, argued that the
pre-printed form simply did not give notice in any meaningful way.15 9
Even more important to Stevens, though, was that the Shutes had not
received their tickets until after they had paid their money."
Second, under the Bremen principles, Justice Stevens would have
held the agreement unenforceable. 161 Because this was a "contract[ ]
of adhesion.., offered on a take-or-leave basis," Stevens reasoned that
it necessitated intensified scrutiny for fairness to the weaker party.' 62
Stevens found this fairness lacking because of the hardship imposed on
the Shutes in litigating in Florida.
1 63
Third, unlike the majority, Justice Stevens believed the agreement to





156. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988).
157. Carnival Cruise, III S. Ct. at 1528.
158. Id at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id
160. Id
161. Id at 1531.
162. Id at 1530-31.
163. Id. at 1532-33.
164. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183c (1988).
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Relying on circuit authority interpreting a similar provision in the
Carriage of Goods at Sea Act (COGSA), 16s Stevens argued for a lib-
eral reading of the statute.1 66 The appropriate rea.ding, Stevens con-
cluded, would void the agreement.
1 67
3. The Troubling Nature of Carnival Cruise
There are many troubling aspects to the Carnival Cruise decision.
One difficult question is whether anything remains of the reasonable-
ness rule announced in Bremen. Although the Brernen principles were
indeterminate, their hallmark was their ability to validate those agree-
ments that, on an intuitive level, seemed fair, and invalidate those that
seemed unfair. The principles in Carnival Cruise, however, seem to
validate every agreement. As discussed above, the majority pointed to
three factors that made the Carnival Cruise clause :reasonable: the risk
of suit in multiple fora, simplification of the jurisdictional inquiry, and
the possibility of reduced transactional costs being passed on to the
consumers.1 68 These factors amount to no real limitation on enforce-
ment. Every large enterprise runs the risk of suits in multiple fora;
every forum selection agreement simplifies the jurisdictional inquiry if
enforced; reduced transaction costs always hold the theoretical possi-
bility of consumer benefit.
Another difficult issue is attempting to divine how and why the
Court ultimately disposed of the case. Carnival sought to enforce the
forum selection agreement in two ways. First, it sought to dismiss the
case for lack of personal jurisdiction, both on the grounds that Carni-
val lacked minimum contacts and that the forum selection agreement
deprived the district court of personal jurisdiction 1 69 Second, Carni-
val sought to enforce the clause with a transfer to the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida under section 1406.17 The district court reached only
the personal jurisdiction issue, and unconditionally dismissed the
case." The Ninth Circuit, in reversing, necessarily had to reach all
the issues, and remanded the case to the district court for trial.
172
165. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1988).
166. Carnival Cruise 111 S. Ct. at 1532-33.
167. Id. at 1533.
168. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.




172. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990).
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The Supreme Court, as noted above, 7' reached only the issue of the
forum selection agreement, and concluded its opinion with the cryptic
disposition: "The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is
so ordered."' 74 The body of the opinion, particularly the portion that
concluded that Florida was an acceptable forum, implied that the case
should be transferred.17 The disposition, however, by not remanding
either to the district court or the Ninth Circuit, implied that the
unconditional dismissal of the district court should be reinstated.1
7 6
The disposition is significant for at least two reasons. First, a dis-
missal almost certainly would bar the Shutes from refiling in Florida
because of the expiration of the statute of limitations. A transfer to
Florida, however, would allow for the action to continue. 177 Second,
assuming that Stewart's rationale applies to section 1406 as well as
section 1404 transfers, the standards for enforcement vary greatly
depending upon the enforcement mechanism. 78 Because the district
court's conclusion that the parties lacked minimum contacts with
Washington does not prevent a section 1406 transfer, 79 the Supreme
Court could have taken this opportunity to clear up some of the issues
surrounding the appropriate enforcement mechanism. Instead, the
Court and the parties ignored the problem and left a great deal to
implication.
Even more troubling, perhaps, is the Court's handling of the notice
issue. As a threshold matter, it is curious that the Court chose to
frame the issue in terms of notice. The real question is whether Carni-
val had formed a contract with the Shutes that included the forum
selection clause. The formation of a contract including this provision
would require the Shutes' assent to the provision.' While notice of
the provision is necessary for assent, it is certainly not sufficient for
assent."8' Although this point seems too obvious for discussion, it
appears to have escaped the majority entirely. Suppose the Shutes had
paid for and received their tickets, and then, two days before leaving,
173. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
174. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1529 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
175. Id at 1528.
176. Carnival's brief sheds no light on the question. The brief prayed that "[t]he judgment of
the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded [to the district court] to be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person or, in the alternative, dismissed or transferred
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)." Brief for the Petitioner at 39.
177. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL Cours 261 (4th ed. 1983).
178. Cf. Freer, supra note 6, at 1128-29 (arguing that § 1406 was the proper statute in
Stewart).
179. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 634 (1964).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 22 (1981).
181. Id. § 23.
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received a telegram from Carnival stating: "Please take notice: Any
litigation arising out of your cruise must take place exclusively in and
before a Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A." To be sure, this
would have provided excellent notice of Carnival's intentions, but it
would not have indicated the Shutes' assent to such an agreement.
What, then, if anything, distinguishes the wording printed on the back
of the ticket from the hypothetical telegram? The answer to this ques-
tion depends on when the contract for passage was formed. There are
two plausible possibilities. The first is that the travel agent was Carni-
val's agent to enter into the contract, and the contract was formed
when the Shutes paid their money in Washington. If this were the
case, the wording on the back of the ticket and the hypothetical tele-
gram would have precisely the same effect. Although the ticket gratu-
itously described itself as a contract,1"2 under this view it was nothing
more than a post-formation communication. 183
The other possibility was that the tickets constituted Carnival's offer
to the Shutes, which the Shutes accepted by presenting them for pas-
sage. Under this view, the wording on the back of t.he tickets could be
part of the contract, since presentment for passage would represent
assent. The problem with this view, however, as Justice Stevens
pointed out, is that the tickets were expressly made non-refundable.184
The presentment for passage cannot represent voluntary assent to the
terms of the contract, because there is a severe eoanomic penalty for
refusing to assent. Thus, the no-refund provision is consistent only
with the view that the contract was formed at some earlier time, pre-
sumably in the travel agent's office.
This issue may have escaped the majority's attention, but Carnival's
lawyers were wise to the problem. In their reply brief, Carnival's law-
yers tried to explain away the no-refund provision by reference to a
brochure "provided to prospective passengers." '85 Although the tick-
ets unconditionally prohibited refunds "of tickets wholly or partly not
used by a passenger," '86 Carnival's lawyers argued that the brochure
"makes clear that refunds are available to passengers who cancel a
reasonable period before the cruise." '187 A more classic case of having
it both ways is hard to imagine. If Carnival wanted to take the posi-
182. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, Ill S. Ct. 1522, 1524 (1991) (copy of ticket
reproduced in appendix to opinion).
183. Cf REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP CONTRACTS § 216 (1981) (additional terms to written
contract enforceable only if supported by separate consideration).
184. Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1529 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 9 n.6.
186. Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1529.
187. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 9 n.6.
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tion that the real contract was in the brochure- given to the Shutes
when they bought their cruise-then why was the forum selection
clause not included in the brochure? If Carnival wanted to take the
position that the tickets were the memorial of the contract, then it
must be bound by the unambiguous no-refund provision in those
tickets.
The final troubling aspect of the Court's opinion was its eagerness to
hang the Shutes on their brief. Although the Court concluded that the
Shutes conceded the issue of notice in their brief,"'8 this was not the
same thing as conceding assent. In fact, the Shutes brief, only two
pages later, hit on the crucial matter by arguing that "[t]he ticket con-
tract also seems to prevent a refund for an unused ticket, thereby
removing the passengers [sic] right to seek a refund if the clause were
offensive."'18 9 Under the circumstances, therefore, the Court's conclu-
sion that the Shutes' waived the issue of whether the clause was part of
the contract-perhaps the most fundamental issue in the case-seems
unjust.
Before turning to a discussion of the unsettled issues remaining in
the wake of the new case law, two other consequences of Carnival
Cruise, both of them felicitous, deserve mention. The first is that by
construing the Limitation of Vessel Owners' Liability Act not to pre-
vent forum selection agreements,"9 Carnival Cruise implicitly over-
ruled Indussa and its progeny,19' which held that a similarly-worded
statute in COGSA prevented forum selection clauses. The similarity
between the COGSA provision and the provision in the Limitation of
Vessel Owners' Liability Act, and Justice Stevens' explicit reliance on
the COGSA cases in dissent, 92 makes clear that COGSA is no longer
an obstacle to enforcement of forum selection agreements. Because
COGSA governs a large number of international commercial transac-
tions, 93 where forum selection clauses are desirable, it was high time
to wipe out this vestige of judicial hostility to contractual jurisdiction.
Second, Carnival Cruise pushed the Court closer than ever to recog-
nizing that personal jurisdiction can no longer be a constitutional
issue. Although the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments have long been thought to limit personal jurisdiction, this
view strains history and is inconsistent with recent Supreme Court
188. Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1525 (citing Brief for the Respondents at 26).
189. Brief for the Respondents at 28.
190. Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1529.
191. See supra note 18.
192. Carnival Cruise, 111 S. Ct. at 1532-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See Black, supra note 18, at 365-66.
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case law.' 94 Carnival Cruise's analysis clearly contemplated that the
forum selection clause must have had both the effect of preventing any
party from suing in any forum besides Florida as well as the effect of
allowing either party to hale the other before Florida courts. Accord-
ingly, if one accepts the view that personal jurisdiction is a right of
constitutional dimension, then the Shutes "waived" a constitutional
right, probably unknowingly, by accepting these tickets and their fine
print. However, allowing such a waiver is inconsistent with the
assumed constitutional status of the right.'95 Supreme Court prece-
dent presumably would not allow for the conclus:ion that an inmate
had waived his constitutional right against self-incrimination because
the sugar packet on his meal tray contained a pre-printed waiver of
rights form. 1
96
The deconstitutionalization of personal jurisdiction is a healthy
development because it holds the best hope for the creation of sensible
and practical jurisdictional rules.197 Taking personal jurisdiction out
of the realm of constitutional law allows for the creation of jurisdic-
tional rules through a comprehensive legislative effort, as opposed to
ad hoc development. Perhaps not coincidentally, the same factors
counsel legislative intervention in the enforcement of forum selection
agreements. However, before turning to that issue, it is necessary to
survey the landscape and assess the issues in need of resolution.
III. CONUNDRUMS
Stewart and Carnival Cruise left a large number of important issues
undecided and their resolution of the issues that they did decide has
some unhappy consequences. Moreover, a substantial number of
other issues have arisen in lower federal courts, but have not been
ruled on by the Supreme Court. Thus, before attempting to devise a
comprehensive plan for congressional action, a reiew of the existing
case authority is vital.
A. Choice of Law
As mentioned above, Stewart did not decide whether state or federal
law applies if enforcement of a forum selection agreement is attempted
by some method other than a transfer under section 1404.198 A large
194. Borchers, supra note 10, at 87-101.
195. See Mullenix, supra note 2, at 303.
196. Cf Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (right not to self-incriminate not waived
even if voluntarily relinquished once request for counsel made by criminal defendant).
197. See Borchers, supra note 10, at 103-05.
198. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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number of cases both before and after Stewart have simply assumed
without discussion that federal law applied, even in diversity cases.199
At least equally frequent were cases that recognized the issue, but
avoided it because of the similarity of state and federal standards.2"
In diversity cases that have explicitly considered and resolved the
issue, the preponderant, but by no means unanimous, view is that fed-
eral law applies. The Seventh Circuit "probably"20 1 takes the position
that federal law applies, and the Ninth Circuit clearly does.2"2 Uncon-
tradicted district court authority in the First203 and Second 2' Circuits
also supports application of federal law in diversity cases.
The Eighth Circuit, however, takes the position that state law
applies.20 5  The Third Circuit also apparently applies state law,2
although it has refused to reaffirm this position after Stewart,"7 and
there is post-Stewart district court authority within the circuit for the
application of federal law.208 The Fourth Circuit may also apply state
law, although the case that supports this assertion, Bryant Electric Co.
v. City of Fredricksburg, 2 is not entirely clear on the matter and may
have been based on a choice-of-law clause pointing to state law.210
The state law position within the Fourth Circuit is bolstered by recent
199. See, ag., Docksider, Ltd. v. Sea Technology, Ltd., 875 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989); Karl
Koch Erecting Co. v. New York Convention Center Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1988);
Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984); LFC
Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1984); Ernst v. Ernst, 722
F. Supp. 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Pascalides v. Irwin Yacht Sales N., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 298 (D.R.I.
1988).
200. See, ag., Crescent Intl, Inc. v. Avatar Communities, Inc., 857 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1988);
Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1982);
Hoffman v. National Equip. Rental, Ltd., 643 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1981); Giroir v. MBank Dallas,
N.A., 676 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Cedarbrook Assoc. v. Equitec Sav. Bank, 678 F. Supp.
107 (E.D. Pa. 1987); ECC Computer Centers of In., Inc. v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc., 597 F.
Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
201. Northwestern Natl Ins. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Heller
Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1989).
202. See, eg., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1988).
203. See, ag., TUC Elecs., Inc. v. Eagle Telephonics, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 35 (D. Conn. 1988);
C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 565 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Mass. 1983); Northeast Theatre
Corp. v. Edie & Ely Landau, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 833 (D. Mass. 1983).
204. See, eg., Ritchie v. Carvel Corp., 714 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Aloha Leasing v.
Craig Germain Co., 644 F. Supp. 561 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
205. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.
1986).
206. See, ag., General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 356-57
(3d Cir. 1986).
207. See, eg., Crescent Int'l Inc. v. Avatar Communities, Inc., 857 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1988).
208. See Lexington Inv. Co. v. Southwest Stainless, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
209. 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1985).
210. See infra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
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district court authority,2" although other Fourth Circuit cases have
preferred to avoid the issue."12 Elsewhere the returns are mixed, with
district court cases both on the state213 and federal214 side of the fence.
There were some optimistic predictions after Stewart that federal
courts would apply federal law in all cases, regardless of the basis for
subject matter jurisdiction or the method of enforcement.215 Other
observers, however, were not so sure.21 6 Stewart's refusal to decide
the issue outside of the transfer context, however, has deepened the
split of authority. The most persuasive opinion in support of the
application of federal law in diversity cases was the Eleventh Circuit's
en banc opinion in Stewart, 217 which other courts have found compel-
ling despite the Supreme Court's equivocal affirmance. 18 In a strange
turn of events, though, the Eleventh Circuit backtracked and
announced in a post-Stewart opinion that it will apply state law in
non-transfer diversity cases.2 19
For jurisdictional bases other than diversity, the picture is less cha-
otic. In non-transfer federal question cases, the cases come down on
the side of application of federal law, the theory apparently being that
state law has less of a claim to application than in diversity cases.220
211. Sterling Forest Assoc. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1394 (E.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd
on other grounds, 840 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988).
212. See, eg., Mercury Coal & Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe and Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315
(4th Cir. 1982) (similarity of state and federal standards preclude3 necessity of resolution);
Hoffman v. National Equip. Rental, Ltd., 643 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1981) (same).
213. See, eg., Medicine Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. Browne, 683 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Mo. 1988);
Snavely's Mill, Inc. v. Officine Roncaglia, S.p.A., 678 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Snider v.
Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Br3fogle v. Carvel Corp., 666
F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Sterling Forest Assoc. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1394
(E.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 840 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1983).
214. See, e.g., American Performance, Inc. v. Sanford, 749 F. Supp. 1094 (M.D. Ala. 1990);
Tisdale v. Shell Oil Co., 723 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Ala. 1987); Grissom v. Colotti, 644 F. Supp. 903
(D.P.R 1986); Houston Int'l Televideo, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex.
1986); Clarkeo Contractors, Inc. v. Texas E. Gas Pipeline Co., 615 F. Supp. 775 (M.D. La.
1985); Benge v. Software Galeria, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Visicorp. v. Software
Arts, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1528 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545
(N.D. Tex. 1982).
215. See, eg., Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990)
("perhaps the circuit split will not survive [Stewart]"); Mullenix, supra note 2, at 338.
216. Freer, supra note 6, at 1139-41.
217. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per
curiam), aff'd on other grounds; 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
218. See, eg., Mannetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1988).
219. Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1989).
220. See, eg., AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Friendly, J.); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982); Ritchie v.
Carvel Corp., 714 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). But see Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman
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Further, Bremen made clear that federal law applies in admiralty
cases.
221
Another choice-of-law issue has sown some confusion. If a forum
selection clause is accompanied by a choice-of-law clause, which is
quite common,222 two possibilities exist. One is that forum law gov-
erns the validity of the forum selection clause; the other is that the law
designated by the choice-of-law clause determines the validity of the
forum selection clause.223 The confusion occurs if forum law would
validate the clause, but the designated law would not.
Some courts have managed to avoid this problem simply by apply-
ing forum law.224 At least one court has reasoned that it is highly
improbable that the parties would have written a forum selection
clause in and out of the contract in the same breath.225 A surprising
number of cases, though, have applied the designated law,226 even if
this meant invalidation of the forum selection clause.227
. Interpretive Issues
Clumsy drafting has presented a number of issues of interpretation
for lower federal courts. Some of the issues are quite fundamental,
such as whether to interpret the agreement as an exclusive or non-
exclusive forum agreement. The Supreme Court has not addressed
most of these issues. National Equipment involved a clause that was
Wheelabrator, Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 201-02 (3d Cir.) (refusing to decide issue because of similarity
of state and federal standards), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983).
221. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
222. Cf Juenger, General Course on Private International Law, 193 RECUEIL DES COURS
119, 305 (1983).
223. See Collins, The Chaparral/Bremen Litigation: Two Commentaries: Choice of Forum
and the Exercise of Judicial Discretion-Resolution of an Anglo-American Conflict, 22 IN'rL &
CoMP. L.Q. 332, 339 (1973); Juenger, supra note 222, at 305; Mullenix, supra note 2, at 347-50.
224. AVC Nederland, 740 F.2d at 155; Bens4 683 F.2d at 722; L.A. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Texas E. Prod. Pipeline Co., 699 F. Supp. 185, 186-87 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
225. Bense, 683 F.2d at 722.
226. See, eg., In re Diaz Contracting, Inc., 817 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1987); General Eng'g
Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986); Colonial Leasing Co. v.
Pugh Bros. Garage, 735 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1984); Polar Shipping, Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping
Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Allen, 688 F. Supp. 1495 (D. Utah
1988); 600 Grant Street Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Leon-Dielmarm Inv. Partnership, 681 F.
Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Coldwell Banker & Co. v. Eyde, 661 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. IlL. 1986);
cf. Hoes of Am., Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205 (C.D. IlL. 1979) (designated law governs
interpretation of clause; lexfori governs validity); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F.
Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (discussing the issue in dictum).
227. See, e.g., Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F. Supp. 977 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(choice-of-law clause points to Texas; lex fori would validate forum selection clause; forum
selection clause invalidated under Texas law).
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clearly non-exclusive;228 Stewart2 29 and Carnival Cruise230 involved
clauses that were clearly exclusive. The Court treated the clause in
Bremen as an exclusive forum selection clause,231 which was the fair-
est reading of it, although it was not a model of drafting clarity.232
In less clear cases, courts have a mild preference for interpreting
unclear provisions as exclusive forum agreements.233 The theory often
invoked is that if the designated forum would have jurisdiction with-
out the clause, giving the clause non-exclusive effect is meaningless.
234
Some inartful clauses, however, have proved especially challenging. A
divided panel of the Fourth Circuit construed a provision stating that
the "[p]lace of jurisdiction is Sao Paulo, Brazil" as having non-exclu-
sive effect, relying on the old standby that a contfract must be con-
strued against the drafter.235 This maxim, though, cuts both ways,
and can lead to either an exclusive or non-exclusive effect depending
on which party is arguing for which effect.236 Other frequently-occur-
ring phrases such as "jurisdiction shall be in.. ." and "the parties
submit to the jurisdiction of.. ." have also given courts trouble, with
cases splitting over the' meaning of nearly identically-worded agree-
228. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
229. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
230. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
231. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2, 20 (1972) (clause stating that "[a]ny
dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice" is "clearly mandatory and all
encompassing").
232. Juenger, supra note 1, at 58.
233. See, eg., Northwestern Natl Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990); Seward
v. Divine, 888 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1989); Commerce Consultants Int'l, Inc. v. Vetreerie Riunite,
S.p.A., 867 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Sterling Forest Assoc. v. Barn.-tt-Range Corp., 840 F.2d
249 (4th Cir. 1988); Zapata Marine Serv. v. O/Y Finnlines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1978);
Samson Plastic Conduit & Pipe Corp. v. Battenfeld Extrusionstechnik GmbH, 718 F. Supp. 886
(M.D. Ala. 1989); L.A. Pipeline Constr. Corp. v. Texas E. Prod. Pipeline Co., 699 F. Supp. 185
(S.D. Ind. 1988); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Allen, 688 F. Supp. 1495 (D. Utah 1988); Bryfogle v.
Carvel Corp., 666 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Pa. 1987); ASM Communicatons, Inc. v. Allen, 656 F.
Supp. 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Friedman v. World Transp., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ill. 1986);
Mississippi River Bridge Auth. v. M/V Pola De Lena, 567 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. La. 1983);
Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp. v. Fiat, S.p.A., 84 F.R.D. 299 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Hoes of
Am., Inc. v. Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205 (C.D. Ill. 1979). See generally Note, Forum Selection:
Selection Agreements Prima Facie Valid if Reasonable-Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan,
GmbH, 10 UCLA-ALASKA L. REv. 99, 103 (1980) (discussing issue in state law cases).
234. See, eg., Sterling Forest Assoc. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 840 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988);
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Allen, 688 F. Supp. 1495 (D. Utah 1988).
235. Citro Florida, Inc. v. Citrovale, S.A., 760 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1985).
236. See, eg., Zapata Marine Serv. v. O/V Finlines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1978)




ments. 237 All of this demonstrates that drafters of interstate and inter-
national contracts are not always attuned to the significant differences
between exclusive and non-exclusive forum agreements, and that
courts, while generally aware of the distinctions, have not developed
any clear interpretive guidelines.
Another difficult question of interpretation arises when the agree-
ment merely refers to "the courts" of a particular political entity, most
often a state. In the case of an agreement pointing to the courts of a
state, there are two obvious possibilities. One is that this refers only to
the state courts of that state; the other is that it refers to both the state
courts and the federal district courts sitting in the state. Often courts
have based their interpretations on tiny distinctions in the wording. A
bare reference to the courts of a state usually is interpreted to mean
both the state and federal courts.238 More convoluted references, how-
ever, have drawn a variety of responses. For instance, references to:
"a court of original jurisdiction of the state of New York; ' 239 an
action "in the courts[ ] of the commonwealth of Massachusetts;
' '24
"the courts of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania;" 24' and an action
for which "venue shall be in Adams County, Colorado"24 were all
interpreted to mean that only the state courts were available. On the
other hand, references to: an action in which "the situs of any suit...
237. Compare Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1987)
(clause stating that the California state courts "shall have jurisdiction" is non-exclusive) and
First Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Supreme Court of the
State of New York... shall have jurisdiction of any dispute" is non-exclusive) with ASM
Communications, Inc. v. Allen, 656 F. Supp. 838, 839-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (clause stating that
"jurisdiction and venue shall be in" the California courts is exclusive); compare Keaty v.
Freeport Indonesia, Inc., 503 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1974) (clause stating that the "parties submit to
the jurisdiction of the courts of New York" is non-exclusive) and Sail v. G.H. Miller & Co., 612
F. Supp. 1499, 1501 (D. Colo. 1985) ("I specifically consent to and submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts of the state of Illinois" is a non-exclusive agreement) and Walter E. Heller & Co. v.
James Godbe Co., 601 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("submit to the jurisdiction of" is a non-
exclusive agreement) with Zions First Nat'l Bank, 688 F. Supp. at 1497 (clause stating that the
parties expressly "submit[ ] to the jurisdiction of" is an exclusive agreement) and Furry v. First
Nat'l Monetary Corp., 602 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Okla. 1984) ("submit to the jurisdiction of" is an
exclusive agreement).
238. See, eg., Zimmerman Metals, Inc. v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 720 F. Supp.
859 (D. Colo. 1989) ("courts of Colorado" means both state and federal courts); Page Constr.
Co. v. Perini Constr. Co., 712 F. Supp. 9 (D.RLI. 1989) (reference to Massachusetts forum
applied to both state and federal courts); City of N.Y. v. Pullman, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 438
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
239. TUC Elecs., Inc. v. Eagle Telephonics, Inc., 698 F. Supp 35, 39 (D. Conn. 1988.
240. LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1984).
241. Spatz v. Nascone, 364 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
242. Intermountain Sys., Inc. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Colo. 1983).
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shall be the County of Orange, State of California;"24 venue in the
"County of Essex and State of New Jersey;" 2" the courts of "the state
of California; '  an action for which "the proper venue... shall be in
Erie County, Pennsylvania;" 2" an action for which "exclusive venue
shall be in the State of Delaware;"247 and an action for which "venue
[shall be] in Fort Bend County, Texas" '248 were all held to encompass
both federal and state courts. This demonstrates that drafters often do
not consider dual court systems when selecting fora, and that the
courts have not hit upon any clear interpretive presumptions.
The final set of interpretive issues centers on the scope of forum
selection clauses. The most frequently-litigated issue in this group is
the question of whether the clause is broad enough to reach all claims
in the case between the parties. In an arbitration context, the Supreme
Court preferred a reading of the provision that encompassed all claims
with a transactional relationship.249  In the context of traditional
forum selection agreements, the lower federal courts usually have
adopted a similar approach, holding that forum clauses encompass all
claims bearing some relationship to the contract giving rise to the
forum clause.250 Occasionally, though, courts have concluded that
243. Brinderson-Newberg Joint Venture v. Pacific Erectors, Inc., 6S0 F. Supp. 891, 892 (C.D.
Cal. 1988).
244. In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1979).
245. Frontier Airlines, Inc. Retirement Plan for Pilots v. Security Fac. Nat'l Bank, N.A., 696
F. Supp. 1403 (D. Colo. 1988).
246. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron 'Workers Local Union 348
v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370, 371 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
247. International Inv. & Equine Consultants, Inc. v. Jebrock, 573 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Pa.
1983).
248. Lexington Inv. Co. v. Southwest Stainless, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 139, 141, 144 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
249. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-28 (1985).
250. See, eg., Crescent Int'l, Inc. v. Avatar Communities, Inc., 85"1 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1988);
Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982); Knutson v. Rexair, Inc., 749 F.
Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1990); Brock v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Tex.
1990); Ritchie v. Carvel Corp., 714 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Advent Elec., Inc. v. Samsung
Semiconductor, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. I1. 1989); Stephens v. Entre Computer Centers,
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Stewart v. Murlas Commodities, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 166
(E.D. Mich. 1988); Pascalides v. Irwin Yacht Sales N., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 298 (D.R.l. 1988);
Tisdale v. Shell Oil Co., 723 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Ala. 1987); Eastern Europe, Inc. v.
Transportmaschinen, Export-Import, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Ronar, Inc. v.
Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Warner & Swasey Co. v. Salvagnini Transferica
S.p.A., 633 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 806 F.2d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Adelson v.
World Transp., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Crescent Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 627 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Rini Wine Co. v. Guild Wireries and Distilleries, 604
F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Clinton v. Janger, 583 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Giordano
v. Witzer, 558 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545
(N.D. Tex. 1982).
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some portion of the case is not covered by the forum clause, leading to
disjointed litigation.2"'
The more difficult question, though, has been the appropriate treat-
ment of persons who are parties to the litigation, but not parties to the
forum agreement. Here the approaches of the courts diverge sharply.
Some courts have held that non-parties to the forum agreement have
the same rights and duties as parties to the forum agreement.2"2
Others have taken the more moderate route and held that non-parties
to the forum agreement are not bound by, and may not enforce, the
agreement, unless some element of traditional contract law-such as
third party beneficiary status-would confer those rights and
duties.253 At the other end of the spectrum, at least one court has
refused to give any effect to a forum selection agreement on the
grounds that only one of six defendants was a party to the forum
agreement.254
Poor drafting and difficult issues of interpretation are not unique to
forum selection agreements. Forum selection agreements, however,
have spawned more than their share of these issues, and, more often
than in other issues of interpretation, courts seem to be adrift without
reliable interpretive guidelines to help chart their course.
251. See, e.g., Seward v. Devine, 888 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1989) (RICO cause of action not
encompassed by agreement); Noel v. S.S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1982) (strained
interpretation of agreement leads to the conclusion that implied indemnity agreement is not
encompassed); Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A., 663 F.2d 886 (9th Cir.
1981) (agreement construed not to reach Sherman Act claims); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 616 F. Supp. 671 (D.N.J. 1985).
252. See, e.g., Brock v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Tex. 1990);
Grossman v. Citrus Assoc. of N.Y. Cotton Exch., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Stephens v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
253. See, e.g., Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3d
Cir. 1989) (bankruptcy-trustee plaintiff bound by forum selection clause because he stands in the
shoes of the party to the agreement); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities,
Inc., 806 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1986) (state law applied, non-parties to agreement cannot be bound);
Moretti & Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Assoc., 668 F. Supp. 103 (D.R.I. 1987) (assignment of
rights effective as to forum selection clause); Consolidated Bathurst, Ltd. v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Gustaf Erikson, 645 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (third-party beneficiary enforcing contract
including a forum selection clause is bound by the clause); Thomas v. Price, 631 F. Supp. 114
($.D.N.Y. 1986); Crescent Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Corp., 627 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ill. 1986);
Interpool Ltd. v. Through Transport Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 635 F. Supp. 1503 (S.D. Fla 1985)
(arbitration agreement; third-party beneficiary is bound by the agreement); Clinton v. Janger,
583 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (third-party beneficiary may enforce a forum clause); Process &
Storage Vessels, Inc. v. Tank Service, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 725 (D. Del. 1982), aff'd, 760 F.2d 260
(3d Cir. 1985) (third-party beneficiary of an agreement seeking to enforce the agreement is bound
by the forum clause); Richardson Eng'g Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 554 F. Supp.
467 (D. Vt. 1981), aff'd, 697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982) (a non-party who novates a contract is
bound by a forum selection agreement).
254. Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 659 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
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C. Transfer Issues
As discussed above,255 Stewart created a dichotomy between
enforcement of forum selection agreements by motions to transfer
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 and enforcement by other mechanisms, such
as a forum non conveniens motion.25 6 In the context of a transfer,
Stewart concluded that a forum selection agreement is only one of sev-
eral significant factors in evaluating the decision to transfer.257 At
least rhetorically, this is a substantially different approach than the
Bremen heavy-presumption-of-validity principle.25 8
At least two factors suggest, therefore, that distract courts have sig-
nificantly more leeway to refuse to enforce exclusive forum selection
agreements in the transfer context. The first is the Stewart formula-
tion itself. By merely making the agreement a factor in the balance,
the Court suggested to district courts that something far less than the
extreme inconvenience necessary to set aside an agreement under the
Bremen standards could justify setting aside an exclusive forum selec-
tion agreement in the transfer context. The second is that, unlike an
order granting a dismissal on jurisdictional or on forum non con-
veniens grounds, an order granting or denying a transfer under section
1404 is not appealable, unless the appellate court is willing to take the
extraordinary step of certifying the matter for interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or granting a writ of mandamus.25 9 This
substantial isolation from review might encourage variable approaches
among district courts.2 °
How much more latitude district courts are taking in the transfer
context is hard to assess because the body of reported cases is quite
small. A fair number of cases involving exclusive forum selection
clauses simply grant or deny transfer, depending upon whether the
court hearing the motion is the designated forum.25' There are, how-
255. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 4 (1972).
257. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1988).
258. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15.
259. See Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NoTRE DAME L.
RV. 443, 472-78 (1990).
260. See Comment, Appealability of a District Court's Denial of a Forum-Selection Clause
Dismissal Motion. An Argument Against "Canceling Out" The Bremen, 57 FORDHAM L. REv.
463, 464 (1988) (denying immediate appeal of denial of motions to dismiss under the Bremen
standards threatens equal application of standards). But see Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490
U.S. 495 (1989) (denying collateral final order status to orders denying dismissal pursuant to
forum selection agreements; effectively rejecting Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator,
Ltd., 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1983)).
261. See, e.g., Page Constr. Co. v. Perini Constr. Co., 712 F. Supp. 9 (D.R.I. 1989); Advent
Elec., Inc. v. Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Stephens v. Entre
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ever, some remarkable counterexamples. Most notably, on remand
from Stewart, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama, though purporting to obey the command from the
Supreme Court to give the clause "significant" weight, decided it was
too onerous for the Alabama party to journey to New York.262
Although the Eleventh Circuit took the unusual step of granting a writ
of mandamus to compel the transfer, the notoriety that the case had
obtained on its trip to the Supreme Court most likely was a factor in
granting the writ.263 On other occasions, though, district courts-
without subsequent appellate intervention-have denied transfers to
enforce exclusive forum selection clauses that doubtlessly would have
merited enforcement under the Bremen standards.2c
Another sticky question, unaddressed by Stewart, is what, if any,
weight to give to a non-exclusive forum agreement in the transfer con-
text. Outside the transfer context the answer is clear. A non-exclusive
forum selection agreement does not deny jurisdiction to any forum;
thus if the forum has jurisdiction (because of the agreement or for any
other reason) it need not defer to any other tribunal. This would sug-
gest that non-exclusive forum selection clauses should not be a factor
in the transfer decision-except in the trivial respect that the trans-
feree court must have jurisdiction over the case26 5-and some courts
have taken this tack.266 Some courts, however, have given non-exclu-
sive forum selection clauses approximately the same weight due exclu-
sive forum selection clauses under Stewart.2 67 This latter approach,
by confusing exclusive and non-exclusive forum agreements, may be
partly responsible for the general lack of understanding of their differ-
Computer Centers, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Paul v. International Precious
Metals Corp., 613 F. Supp. 174 (S.D. Miss. 1985). But cf Moses v. Business Card Express, Inc.,
929 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1991) (questioning propriety of transferring on the basis of a forum
selection clause without full investigation of all relevant factors).
262. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 696 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
263. In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1989). Thus, on the sixth try, the Ricoh
Corporation finally got its clause enforced.
264. See Nelson v. Master Lease Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Minn. 1991) (denying transfer
in a sex discrimination case on the basis of a forum selection clause contained in an employment
contract); Hoffman v. Minuteman Press Int'l, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Fibra-
Steel, Inc. v. Astoria Indus., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
265. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
266. See, eg., Kachal, Inc. v. Menzie, 738 F. Supp. 371 (D. Nev. 1990); Sterling Forest
Assoc. v. Barnett-Range Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1394 (E.D.N.C. 1987), rev'd on other ground. 840
F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Steckler, 657 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Crook, 567 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Coface v. Optique du
Monde, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
267. See, eg., Heller Fin., Inc. v. Shop-A-Lot, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. II. 1988); Heller
Fin., Inc. v. Nutra Food, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1432 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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ences evidenced in contract drafting.268 At a minimum, the divergent
approaches shown by district courts in the transfe:r context are good
evidence that Stewart created problems that did not exist before.
D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Issues
Another set of problems, largely untouched by the Supreme Court,
relates to subject matter jurisdiction. It is quite clear that parties may
not, by agreement, create subject matter jurisdiction in courts of lim-
ited subject matter jurisdiction.2 69  Because the federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, an agreement to litigate a case in federal
court without some basis for subject matter jurisdiction, such as diver-
sity of parties or the presence of a federal question, is clearly void.
2 70
The more interesting question is whether, in matters in which the
state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the parties can
make an enforceable agreement to litigate in one or the other of those
courts. The Supreme Court's original answer was tlaat the parties may
not make such an agreement. As noted above,27 1 :n Insurance Co. v.
Morse,272 the Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin statute extracting
the consent of insurance companies doing business in Wisconsin was
invalid. Morse relied on the ouster rationale,2 71 subsequently discred-
ited by Bremen. Bremen treated Morse gingerly, however, observing
in a footnote that Morse presented a question of "an unconstitutional
condition on the exercise of the federal right of removal,"'274 an issue
not raised in Bremen.
There are occasional suggestions in the cases275 and the commen-
tary2 7 6 that the federal courts are reluctant to hold that the parties can
contract away their subject matter jurisdiction, especially when
obtained by removal from state court. Courts do have a mild prefer-
ence for finding that ambiguous references to the courts of a state also
refer to the federal courts sitting within the state, and avoiding the
issue.2 77 But most often courts hold that the right to elect between
268. See supra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
269. See, eg., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975).
270. C. WRIGHrT, supra note 177, at 22-26.
271. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
272. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
273. Id. at 451.
274. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 n.10 (1972).
275. See, eg., Zimmerman Metals, Inc. v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 720 F. Supp.
859 (D. Colo. 1989); John's Insulation, Inc. v. Siska Constr. Co., 671 F. Supp. 289, 294-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (agreement to "commence" action in state court dors not preclude removal).
276. See Mullenix, supra note 2, at 344-46.
277. See supra notes 238-48 and accompanying text.
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state and federal courts with concurrent jurisdiction is the subject of
bargaining, and the parties' choice will not be set aside unless the
agreement is void under the Bremen standards." 8 Nonetheless,
Bremen's hint that subject matter jurisdiction might be special, cou-
pled with occasional case authority evincing reluctance to allow par-
ties to bargain away their right to federal court access, holds the
possibility of litigant and judicial confusion.
E. The Reasonableness Test
Bremen set forth several different bases for concluding that a forum
selection agreement might be invalid. Unlike most of the other issues
discussed, the Supreme Court has spoken again on this topic. The
Court's vehicle, as discussed above, was the Carnival Cruise case.27 9
The question here is more fundamental: is there anything left of the
reasonableness test articulated by the Court in Bremen?
One basis for setting aside an agreement, not addressed in Carnival
Cruise, is the group of standard contract defenses including fraud and
duress.28 0 Many dicta, but few holdings, suggest that forum agree-
ments obtained by fraud or duress are unenforceable.281  These
defenses apply narrowly in the context of forum agreements. In
Scherk the Supreme Court concluded that in the arbitration context,
fraud or duress must be shown as to the forum agreement itself.2
2
Thus if the forum agreement is one clause in a larger agreement, an
allegation of invalidity as to the larger agreement will not act as a
278. See, eg., Seward v. Devine, 888 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1989); Docksider, Ltd. v. Sea
Technology, Ltd., 875 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989); Karl Koch Erecting Co., v. New York
Convention Center Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1988); Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of
Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1985); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality
Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984); LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance
Corp., 739 F.2d 4 (Ist Cir. 1984); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co.,
492 F.2d 1294 (Ist Cir. 1974); American Performance, Inc. v. Sanford, 749 F. Supp. 1094 (M.D.
Ala. 1990); Ritchie v. Carvel Corp., 714 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Medical Legal
Consulting Serv., Inc. v. Covarrubias, 648 F. Supp. 153 (D. Md. 1986); Grissom v. Colotti, 644
F. Supp. 903 (D.P.R. 1986); Cessna Aircraft Corp. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 616 F. Supp. 671
(D.N.J. 1985); Intermountain Sys., Inc. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Colo. 1983);
Public Water Supply Dist. No. 1 v. American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1071 (w.D. Mo. 1979);
Spatz v. Nascone, 368 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
279. See supra notes 144-67 and accompanying text.
280. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
281. See, eg., Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988) (arbitration
agreement); Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.
1986); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984); Ritchie v.
Carvel Corp., 714 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Stephens v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc., 696
F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
282. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974).
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defense to the forum selection. Lower federal courts have transported
the requirement of showing fraud or duress as to the clause from the
arbitration context to the context of traditional forum selection agree-
ments.283 Thus, to avoid the effect of a forum selection agreement, a
party must show that unusual circumstances exist, for example that
the other party fraudulently altered the memorial of the contract to
insert the forum selection clause.2
Another basis for invalidating a forum selection agreement under
the Bremen principles is the lack of actual negotiation and the exist-
ence of "overweening bargaining power. '2 5  Carnival Cruise, how-
ever, rejected this as a defense altogether. From the standpoint of
showing an inequality of bargaining power and a lack of actual negoti-
ation, Carnival Cruise offers appealing facts for settling aside the agree-
ment. As Judge Posner, speaking of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Carnival Cruise, noted: "If there ever was a case for stretching the
concept of fraud in the name of unconscionability, it was [Carnival
Cruise]; and perhaps no stretch was necessary. 286 Moreover the fac-
tors substituted for analysis of the bargaining strength of the parties
are sure to result in validation of nearly every conceivable agree-
ment.287  The Supreme Court's refusal to invalidate the Carnival
Cruise agreement, therefore, signalled that the adhesive nature of a
contract is no longer a defense to enforcement of a forum selection
agreement.
288
283. See supra note 281.
284. Cf Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 3"17 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J.) (party has a duty to read a contract before signing; ignorance of forum selection clause if
visibly contained in the written memorial is no defense; "The print is small, but it is not fine; it is
large enough that even the pale copies in the appendix on appeal can be read comfortably by the
author of this opinion, with his heavily corrected middle-aged eyesight.").
285. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
286. Northwestern Natl 916 F.2d at 376.
287. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text for discussion of the factors.
288. Before Carnival Cruise, opinions occasionally struck down forum selection agreements
for lack of bargaining or as an adhesive contract. See, eg., Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Bros.
Garage, 735 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1984); Yoder v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 756
(E.D. Va. 1986) (arbitration agreement); Galli v. Travelhost, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Nev.
1985); Couch v. First Guar. Ltd., 578 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Tex. 1984); Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake
Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (collateral attack to judgment). This
argument, however, though often raised, was seldom successful. See, eg., Northwestern Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883
F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1989); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905 (3d
Cir. 1988) (forum selection agreement on the back of a cruise ticket enforced), cert. dismissed,
490 U.S. 1001 (1989); Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir.
1986); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984);
Lien Ho Hsing Steel Enter. Co. v. Weihtag, 738 F.2d 1455 (9th Cir. 1984); Mercury Coal &
Coke, Inc. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 696 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1982); L.A. Pipeline
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Finally, Bremen suggested that "serious inconvenience of the con-
tractual forum" that "will for all practical purposes... [deprive a
party of its] day in court" '289 would be grounds for invalidating the
agreement. Whether or not Carnival Cruise changed the law in this
regard is difficult to evaluate. The Carnival Cruise majority showed no
great sympathy for the Shutes' contention that Florida was an incon-
venient forum. The majority rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that the Shutes would be financially incapable of pursuing the case in
Florida, tersely noting that the district court had made no such find-
ing.29 Moreover, Florida was a rational choice from Carnival's stand-
point because its principal offices are located there.291
The implication of the majority's discussion is that if the party seek-
ing enforcement had some cogent reason for choosing the contractual
forum at the time that the contract was formed, that choice will be
honored. As a rhetorical matter, this was a shift from Bremen, which
suggested that the test for inconvenience was far more fact-specific and
objective than the line of inquiry pursued by the Carnival Cruise
majority. As a practical matter, though, this probably does not repre-
sent a substantial shift from post-Bremen case law. Although the
"inconvenience" argument has been often raised in lower federal
courts, it has been rejected routinely, with courts approving a wide
variety of domestic and foreign fora.
292
Constr. Co. v. Texas E. Prod. Pipeline Co., 699 F. Supp. 185 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Stephens v. Entre
Computer Centers, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines,
Ltd., 677 F. Supp. 269 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (forum selection agreement on the back of a cruise ticket
enforceable because the passengers had the tickets for two to three weeks prior to the cruise);
Hollander v. K-Lines Hellenic Cruises, S.A., 670 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (forum selection
agreement on the back of a cruise ticket is enforceable); Dukane Fabrics Int'l, Inc. v. MV.
Hreljin, 600 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Systems, Inc., 570 F.
Supp. 708 (D.R.I. 1983); Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868 (D. Minn. 1980).
289. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17-18.
290. Carnival Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Shute, l1l S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1991).
291. Id.
292. See, e-g., Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp., 885 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1989) (Saudi
administrative tribunal is an adequate alternative forum); Commerce Consultants Int'l, Inc. v.
Vetrerie Riunite, S.p.A., 867 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Italy is an adequate alternative forum);
Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1986) (West Germany
is a reasonable alternative forum); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741
F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1984) (California is a reasonable forum notwithstanding the fact that the
witnesses are on the East Coast); Crown Beverage Co. v. Cerveceria Moctezuma, S.A., 663 F.2d
886 (9th Cir. 1981) (Mexico is acceptable alternative forum); Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco
Engineers, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975) (Uruguay is a reasonable alternative forum); Ernst
v. Ernst, 722 F. Supp. 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (France is a reasonable alternative forum); Samson
Plastic Conduit & Pipe Corp. v. Battenfeld Extrusionstechnik GmbH, 718 F. Supp. 886 (M.D.
Ala. 1989); Damigos v. Flanders Compania Naviera, S.A.-Panama, 716 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (Greece is an acceptable alternative forum); Tisdale v. Shell Oil Co., 723 F. Supp. 653
(M.D. Ala. 1987) (Labor Commission of Saudi Arabia is a reasonable alternative forum); Ronar,
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One variant of the unreasonable forum argument, however, should
survive Carnival Cruise. In some instances parties have agreed to a
forum, and then circumstances have changed so severely that the
forum would undoubtedly be less fair to the party than when the con-
tract was formed. Most commonly this has occurred if the parties,
prior to the Iranian revolution in 1979, contracted to have cases heard
in the Iranian courts. In this circumstance, lower federal courts usu-
ally have released parties from their obligation to litigate in Iran.2 93
There is no reason that this sensible doctrine should not survive Carni-
val Cruise.
Accordingly, very little of the reasonableness test set forth in
Bremen remains. Although occasionally a forum selection agreement
may be unenforceable-for instance a true case of fraud or genuinely
changed circumstances-the vast majority of agreements that are gov-
erned by Carnival Cruise must survive under its approach.
Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (West Germany is an adequate alternative
forum); Warner & Swasey Co. v. Salvagnini Transferica S.p.A., 633 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D.N.Y.
1986) (Italy is a reasonable alternative forum for a patent action); Saniamauro v. Taito do Brasil
Industria E Comercia Ltda., 587 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D. La. 1984) (Brazil is a reasonable alternative
forum). But see Karlberg European Tanspa, Inc. v. JK-Josef Kratz Vertriebsgeselischaft MbH,
699 F. Supp 669 (N.D. Ii. 1988) (West Germany is an unreasonable forum because German
courts will not as effectively enforce Sherman Act claims); Morse Electro Prods. Corp. v. S.S.
Great Peace, 437 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1977) (stating in dictum that Nationalist China is an
unreasonable alternative forum); Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler, 347 F.
Supp. 53, 55 (W.D. Pa. 1972) ("obvious impracticality of conducting the litigation in Germany"
renders forum agreement unenforceable).
293. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.)
(unforeseeable changed circumstances in Iran make clause unenforceable because it would be
impossible for McDonnell Douglas to litigate in that forum), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985);
Rockwell Int'l Sys., Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 719 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1983) (unforeseeable changed
circumstances in Iran make clause unenforceable); Continental Grain Export Corp. v. Ministry
of War-Etlm Co., 603 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). But see National Iranian Oil Co. v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.) (no changed circumstances because clause entered into
in 1979 when impossibility of American participation in proceedings was foreseeable because of
Islamic revolution in which National Iranian had participated; however, practical effect of
decision is to leave Iranian corporation without a remedy), cert denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987). See
generally Stein, Jurisprudence and Jurists' Prudence." The Iranian-Forum Clause Decisions of the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (1984); Comment, Mandatory Forum
Selection Clauses and Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Iran's Litigation Problems in United States
Courts, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 12 B10OKLYN J. INT'L L. 553,
574-76 (1986); Comment, National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc.: All Dressed up and
Nowhere to Arbitrate, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1142, 1164-65 (1988) (criticizing National Iranian's
holding that the Iranian revolution was foreseeable at the time of contracting); Note, Changed
Circumstances and the Iranian Claims Arbitration: Applications to Forum Selection Clauses and
Frustration of Contract, 16 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 335 (1982).
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
The preceding part is not, of course, a complete canvass of all the
issues that have ever been litigated in the federal courts with regard to
forum selection agreements. The survey of the salient issues does,
however, provide a basis for formulating a program for comprehensive
statutory reform.
A. The Need for Congressional Reform
Before taking up the question of what route congressional reform
should take, there is the more fundamental issue of whether any statu-
tory action is necessary. Arguably, in an area that has developed
largely as a matter of federal common law, the burden of persuasion is
on those who wish to invoke congressional action. There is thoughtful
commentary arguing that better-reasoned opinions hold the key to fair
and predictable results as to the enforcement of forum selection
agreements.
2 94
Nevertheless, several factors clearly point towards a need for con-
gressional action. The first is the sheer number of unresolved issues.
As the preceding part demonstrates, there are at least five major
groups of issues upon which there is conflict.295 Within those five
groups multiple matters remain unsettled. It is quite unlikely that
even if the Supreme Court takes several cases on this topic in the next
few years it will resolve all of them. Unresolved issues are not in and
of themselves objectionable, but they are nettlesome in this context.
The rationale for making forum selection a matter of bargaining is that
it is a right of some estimable value.296 Allowing it to become the
subject of bargaining does not injure non-parties to the agreement and
avoids the unacceptable transaction costs of litigating convoluted
jurisdictional doctrine.2 97
Fundamental unresolved issues, however, drain the life out of this
rationale. Difficult questions of, for instance, whether state or federal
law govern enforcement, make it much more difficult to estimate the
economic value of the agreement, because whatever value it has to the
contracting party must be discounted by the probability that the agree-
294. Mullenix, supra note 2, at 305, 366-72; cf Casenote, The Enforcement of Forum
Selection Provisions in International Commercial Agreements M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., I1 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 459 (1972) ("danger" that Bremen will lead to
congressional intervention).
295. See supra notes 198-293 and accompanying text.
296. Northwestern Nat'1 Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990); Juenger,
supra note 1, at 50.
297. See Borchers, supra note 10, at 103.
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ment will not be enforced. Beyond that, the presence of these difficult
questions greatly increases the transaction costs by encouraging com-
plicated litigation with layer upon layer of appellate review.298
Thus, as long as forum selection agreements remain partially in
limbo, they will necessarily have less than maximal social utility. A
statute, therefore, as long as it is reasonably clear and does not create
more problems than it solves, is desirable. Of course, the common law
process might possibly lead down the road of certainty and clarity.
However, in Stewart and Carnival Cruise, the Court demonstrated its
penchant to raise more issues than it resolves,2 99 strongly suggesting
that congressional action is the safer route.
Second, setting aside the questions of clarity and certainty, Carnival
Cruise showed that the Court is headed in the wrong direction. The
justification for enforcing forum selection agreements extends only
insofar as the contracting parties have access to encugh information to
understand the economic significance of the agreement and the trans-
action is of sufficient magnitude that it is likely the parties will bargain
and thereby distribute the benefits and burdens between them.
Bremen recognized that there is some line, though perhaps indistinct,
beyond which forum selection agreements are transformed from
instruments of economic freedom to instruments of economic oppres-
sion.A Wherever that line is, the Carnival Cruise agreement was
clearly on the economic oppression side of it. In making a decision as
to which cruise package to purchase, a consumer is in a position to
compare the salient features such as price, the duration and the desti-
nations. But to ask a consumer to make a reasoned judgment as to the
economic benefits and burdens of competing forum selection clauses
strains reality. Only the rare consumer appreciates the clauses' signifi-
cance. Unlike larger transactions, it is not economically rational for a
consumer of a vacation cruise to seek professional advice as to the
significance of the forum clause. Thus, as a basic matter of fairness,
the doctrine is in need of repair, and the Court's recent decisions make
clear that any repair will have to come from Congress.
Third, congressional action is more likely to prcduce solutions that
are clear without seriously compromising fairness. Legislation is
inherently more capable of drawing sharp lines, such as rendering
forum selection clauses void if included in a contract below a thresh-
298. See eg., Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 713 F. Supp. 1419 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (clause finally
enforced after six rounds of litigation).
299. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
300. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
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old value 0 1 or in an employment contract.30 2 The economic concerns
at stake are more susceptible of legislative evaluation. Judicial doc-
trine, even if acceptable from a fairness standpoint, depends upon case
by case resolution for its ultimate content, and thus must sacrifice clar-
ity. While lack of clarity is not always objectionable, it is problematic
in this context.
Fourth, forum selection has been the topic of legislative action
before. Determining whether those efforts have been a success is a
complex evaluative process that need not detain us here. Some legisla-
tion, such as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)30 3 and the Brussels
Convention on the Recognition of Enforcement of Judgments 3 ' enjoy
good reputations. Other legislation, such as the Model Choice of
Forum Act,30 5 which was adopted by only four states and subse-
quently withdrawn,31 and the Hague Convention, which was never
ratified,30 7 have had less influence. But the fact that there have been
prior legislative efforts contributes to the basic understanding of the
subject and suggests various routes that contemplated reform might
take.
B. A Proposal for Congressional Action
It is one thing to state in the abstract that congressional action is
desirable. It is entirely another to attempt to formulate a workable
solution. In the appendix to this Article, a statutory proposal is set
forth in full. The following defends and offers an explanation of the
proposed statute.
L Scope
The proposed statute applies to any agreement evidenced by a writ-
ing to litigate a dispute in any forum. Forum is defined broadly in
301. See, eg., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 1989).
302. See, eg., 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
303. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71
VA. L. REv. 1305, 1305-06 (1985) ("Arbitration is once again in vogue. In the last three years,
the Court has fulfilled the promise of its earlier decision and dramatically expanded the ambit of
the FAA.").
304. Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European Communities A
Comparison, 82 MICH. L. Rav. 1195, 1207-08 (1984).
305. MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM Acr (1968), reprinted in 17 AM. J. COMp. L. 292 (1969).
306. W. REESE, M. ROSENBERG & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS
184 (9th ed. 1990); Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially Over International Defendant: Critical
Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. Rav. 593, 594 (noting
withdrawal in 1975 of Model Choice of Forum Act).
307. Hague Convention on the Choice of Court, opened for signature Nov. 25, 1965, 4 I.L.M.
348.
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section 1(b) to include all dispute resolving bodies except for arbitra-
tors and arbitration panels. The reason for excluding arbitration is
that it is already the subject of the FAA as well as the 1957 New York
Convention.308 The same section also excludes agreements to confess
judgment and similar agreements because of their draconian nature
and the general trend against their enforcement." '
Section 2 of the proposed statute makes clear that it applies only to
federal court actions. There are several reasons for this. First, the
need for forum selection agreements is greatest in interstate and inter-
national disputes, which often present some basis for federal jurisdic-
tion. Second, as discussed above, several vexing issues peculiar to the
federal courts are in need of resolution.31 Attempting to draft a
proposal applicable to state courts would mean ignoring these
problems and thereby diminishing the efficacy of the proposed solu-
tion. Third, changes in federal doctrine in this area, spur state reform,
as demonstrated by widespread state court adoption of the Bremen
principles.311
Section 2 also makes clear that the same standards apply to all fed-
eral court actions, regardless of the basis for subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Congress clearly has the power to pass such a statute. 312 This
does not answer the question, however, of whethe.r it is wise to have
uniform rules applicable for all jurisdictional bases in federal court
actions. Justice Scalia argued in dissent in Stewart,31 3 and some com-
mentators have agreed,314 that the risk of intrastate forum shopping
caused by different state and federal standards requires federal court
deference to state standards, at least in diversity cases.
This argument, however, overlooks the fact that preventing intra-
state forum shopping only encourages interstate forum shopping. As
long as the states have different rules on this subject, sophisticated liti-
gants will travel to the state in which the law is most favorable. The
only way to discourage interstate forum shopping is to develop uni-
form rules that transcend state lines. Requiring all federal courts to
adhere to the same rule is a substantial step in this direction. More-
over, the likelihood of the existence of federal subject matter jurisdic-
308. See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text.
309. See Reese, supra note 23, at 195 (rationale for excluding from the Model Choice of
Forum Act).
310. See supra notes 198-227, 269-78 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 77.
312. In fact, this is one of the holdings of Stewart. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 32 (1988).
313. IaL at 39-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
314. See, eg., Freer, supra note 6, at 1123-24; Mullenix, supra note 2, at 337-38.
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tion in interstate and international disputes means that relatively few
of these cases will remain in the state courts. Thus a uniform federal
rule, not deference to the state rules, is the route to uniformity and
litigant fairness.
Section 5 of the proposed statute states that it applies notwithstand-
ing the existence of a choice-of-law clause designating some other law
to govern the rest of the contract. The risk is that the parties will
designate some law that voids the forum selection clause, thus making
it unclear whether the forum clause should be enforced.315 The better-
reasoned cases on this subject point out that it is highly unlikely that
the parties intended to write the forum selection clause in and out of
the contract in the same breath.316 The proposed statute requires
application of forum law, while making clear that the choice-of-law
clause remains effective for other purposes. This approach does not
limit party autonomy. If the parties do not wish to make a forum
selection agreement, they need not. Section 5, therefore, simply
removes a trap for the unwary.
Finally, section 2 excludes bankruptcy actions from the statute's
reach. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, the cases on the
effectiveness of forum selection agreements in the bankruptcy context
are in conflict, and depend upon technical matters such as the context
in which the matter arises and whether it is the bankruptcy trustee or
a creditor seeking enforcement.317 Second, commentators have noted
that forum selection agreements in bankruptcy actions are in tension
with the principle of providing a single forum to adjudicate and dis-
pose of the estate.318 This is not to suggest that some statutory solu-
tion is not appropriate in bankruptcy matters, only that these matters
probably should not be painted with the same brush as other federal
court actions.
315. See supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
316. See, eg., Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys., 683 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1982).
317. See, eg., Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3d
Cir. 1989) (forum selection clause enforceable in non-core adversary bankruptcy proceedings;
trustee-plaintiff bound by the clause because he stands in the shoes of the party to the contract);
Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator, Ltd., 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1983) (forum
selection clause enforceable by creditor in bankruptcy proceeding); Societe Nationale Algerienne
Pour La Recherche, La Production, Le Transport, La Transformation et La Commercialisation
des Hydrocabures v. Distrigas Corp., 80 Bankr. 606 (D. Mass. 1987) (arbitration clause
enforceable in adversary proceeding); Coar v. Brown, 29 Bankr. 806 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (arbitration
clause not enforceable in bankruptcy matters); In re Brookhaven Textiles, Inc., 21 B.R. 204
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (same).
318. See, eg., Westbrook, The Coming Encounter International Arbitration and Bankruptcy,
67 MiNN. L. REV. 595, 596-97 (1983).
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2. Issues of Interpretation
Sections l(d), 3, and 4 relate to issues of interpretation.319 Section
3(a) generally requires a reasonable interpretation of an agreement,
while the rest of the section provides more specific guidance. Section
3(b)(1) creates a presumption in favor of interpreting a forum selection
agreement as an exclusive forum selection agreement. This codifies
the majority approach on the theory that in doubtful cases an exclu-
sive forum selection agreement probably effectuates the parties' inten-
tions.32 Of course, nothing prevents the parties from making a non-
exclusive forum agreement, as long as the agreement is reasonably
clear to that effect.
Section 3(b)(2) creates a presumption that a reference to the courts
of some geographical area or political entity is a reference to all courts
having subject matter jurisdiction in that area or within that political
entity. Again, this codifies the majority approach aad is most likely to
give reasonable effect to the intentions of the parties by avoiding sub-
ject matter jurisdiction problems.32 1 Section 3(b)(3) also endeavors to
avoid subject matter jurisdiction problems by selecting a reasonable
alternative forum in the event that the parties designate only courts
that lack competence to decide the case. So, for instance, if the parties
enter into an exclusive forum selection agreement designating a state
court for an action that is a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction,
section 3(b)(3) designates a reasonable alternative forum, in this case,
the federal court embracing that state court. If the matter is one that
cannot be brought in a single forum for reasons of sabject matter juris-
diction,322 section 3(b)(3) requires designation of the most reasonable
multiple fora.
Section l(d) creates a presumption that all claims which have a
common nucleus of operative fact are encompassed by the forum
agreement. This is the majority approach, 21 which is eminently
sound. Bringing claims with a transactional relationship within the
reach of the agreement most probably accords with the reasonable
expectations of the parties, and avoids in most instances the ineffi-
ciency of having litigation spread across fora.
Section 4 addresses the problem of non-parties to the agreement
who are parties to the litigation. The proposed statute takes the mod-
319. See supra notes 231-54 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
322. See, eg., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
323. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
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erate route among the divergent approaches of the courts. The statute
provides that non-parties to the agreement are bound by the agree-
ment only if they would be bound under the contract rules ordinarily
applicable in commercial transactions.324 Thus, a party that is a third-
party beneficiary of a contract including a forum clause may enforce
and must be bound by the clause, but a party to the litigation who just
happens to have co-parties that entered into a forum agreement is not
bound. This avoids the unfairness and analytical difficulties inherent
in binding a person to an agreement that he or she did not make and
from which he or she has received no benefit. Section 4 addresses the
potential inefficiency of having litigation in different fora by making
clear that the district court's power to transfer an action under 28
U.S.C §§ 1404 and 1406 is not affected. Thus, if under the forum
agreement, some of the parties to the litigation will be proceeding
before another district court, section 4 allows for the transfer of the
other parties if it would be justified under section 1404 or section 1406.
3. Enforcement
Much of the proposed statute addresses the problems created by
having a variety of different mechanisms for enforcing forum selection
agreements and the variable standards of enforcement. Several provi-
sions in the proposal address these problems.
Section 2 provides that the proposal is the exclusive means for
enforcing forum selection agreements in the federal courts. This elimi-
nates the Stewart problem of variable standards by making the stan-
dards of the proposed statute uniformly applicable.
Section 6 covers the specifics of enforcement. Section 6(a) forbids
the district court from dismissing a case for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion or defect of venue if the court is one of the designated fora in an
exclusive forum agreement, or, in the case of a non-exclusive forum
agreement, if the forum has personal jurisdiction and venue. Section
6(a) also provides that if other district courts are proper fora, the dis-
trict court may transfer the case to one of those other district courts.
So, for instance, if the forum agreement is an exclusive forum agree-
ment that points to more than one district court, the district court may
transfer the case to one of those other district courts if transfer would
be justified under section 1404. Similarly, if the forum selection agree-
ment is a non-exclusive forum agreement, section 6(a) allows for trans-
fer to another district court that has jurisdiction and venue, provided
that transfer would be justified under section 1404.
324. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
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Section 6(b) covers instances in which the district court is not a
proper forum. If the case was removed from a state court that was a
proper forum, and the district court is not a proper forum, section
6(b)(1) requires remand to the state court. This accords with the
majority approach and endorses the position that access to federal
court in cases of concurrent jurisdiction is a right that can be bar-
gained away, as are other choices regarding forum.325
Section 6(b)(2) covers instances in which the district court is not a
proper forum, but some other district court is a proper forum. In
these circumstances, section 6(b)(2) provides for transfer, in a manner
like that provided for in section 1404 and section 1406, to some other
district court that is a proper forum. The reason for adopting a trans-
fer approach is that it prevents problems with the statute of limitations
caused by requiring the plaintiff to refile. Section 6(b)(2) also adopts
the section 1406 rule that the transferee court applies its own choice-
of-law rules, and ignores those of the transferor court.326 This avoids
law shopping, that is, the party filing in an obviously improper forum
to take advantage of its substantive law, knowing that the action will
ultimately be transferred to a forum with a less favorable law.327
Section 6(b)(3) covers instances in which the district court is not a
proper forum and no other district court is a proper forum. This
occurs, for instance, in the case of an exclusive forum agreement
pointing to the courts of a foreign nation or some state court. In these
circumstances, the proposed statute requires dismissal of the case.
Section 7, however, allows the dismissal to be conditional, in the man-
ner of a forum non conveniens dismissal. Thus, the district court has
the power to require the moving party to waive the defense of limita-
tions328 and accept service in the refiled action in a reasonable manner.
Section 7 also endorses the sensible rule that in some circumstances
the district court may find it just to retain any attachment obtained in
order to secure any foreign judgment ultimately obtained.32 9
325. See supra notes 271-78 and accompanying text.
326. Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1983). But cf Ferens v. John
Deere, Inc., 110 S. Ct 1274, 1280-81 (1990) (§ 1404 transfer by defendant); Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 637-39 (1964) (§ 1404 transfer by plaintiff).
327. Cf Ferens v. John Deere, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990) (plaintiff who makes a transfer
motion under § 1404 is entitled to the benefit of the law of the transferor forum).
328. See e.g., Santamauro v. Taito do Brasil Industria e Comercia Ltda., 587 F. Supp. 1312
(E.D. La. 1984); Paterson, Zochonis (U.K.) Ltd. v. Compania United Ar-rows, S.A., 493 F. Supp.
626 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
329. See, e.g., Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982)
(district court may maintain attachment of ship to enforce any favorable judgment obtained in
the English courts); Teyseer Cement Co. v. Halla Maritime Corp., 583 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D.




4. Exceptions to Enforcement
The problem of which agreements to enforce and which to void is,
of course, the heart of the matter. It is this problem that undoubtedly
will generate the most controversy in any reform effort, and this area
in which a comparison with other solutions may well prove the most
valuable.
The problem with the Carnival Cruise approach of validating every
agreement, no matter how adhesive, is that the economic rationale for
validating forum selection agreements breaks down in this context.
Weaker parties to small transactions simply do not have access to
enough information to evaluate forum selection clauses and the costs
of obtaining this information are prohibitively high in relation to the
size of the transaction. The difficulty, therefore, is attempting to dis-
tinguish those transactions in which enforcement is fair from those in
which it is not fair.
The Bremen approach is tempting, with its reliance on an ad hoc
judgment as to what is fair and what is not. At least two problems
with the basic-fairness approach appeared over the years. The first is
unpredictable results. In attempting to apply the Bremen criteria
courts arrived at substantially divergent results.330 This is problematic
because not only does it produce some unacceptable results, it greatly
reduces the value of forum selection agreements as a tool of economic
planning. The second major problem is that this approach invests a
high degree of confidence in judicial competence to distinguish the fair
from the unfair. Carnival Cruise pointedly demonstrates that any
abiding confidence in this respect is misplaced.
There have been several different efforts to address these difficulties.
The FAA simply excludes "contracts for employment" '331 from its
reach. Likewise, German law prohibits enforcement of forum agree-
ments that arise out of "individual labor cases." '332 The Brussels Con-
vention steers a similar course by employing categorical exclusions.
expressly exclusive); Wijsmuller B.V. v. Tug Benasque, 528 F. Supp. 1081 (D. Del. 1981); cf.
Sanko Steamship Co. v. Newfoundland Refining Co., 411 F. Supp. 285 (S.D.N.Y.) (attachment
set aside because of forum selection clause), aff'd, 538 F.2d 313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
858 (1976); Gaskin v. Stumm Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same).
330. See supra notes 280-93 and accompanying text.
331. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Recently, however, the Court has taken an extremely narrow view
of this exclusion, requiring in essence that the arbitration agreement be a part of a document that
constitutes a memorial of the entire terms of the employment contract. Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., Ill S. CL 1647, 1651 n.2 (1991). The proposed statute rejects this
interpretation by stating broadly that its exemption applies to all agreements that "arise[ ] out of
a contract of employment." See infra app., § 8(b).
332. Perillo, supra note 1, at 165.
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Article 12 prohibits enforcement of a forum selection agreement in a
contract for insurance unless it is agreed to after the dispute has
arisen,333 is favorable to the policy-holder,334 or involves certain types
of insurance generally purchased only by businesses. 35 Article 15 of
the Brussels Convention also prohibits forum selection agreements in
consumer contracts until after the dispute has arisen or unless the
agreement is favorable to the consumer.336 These exclusions are all
based on the common-sense proposition that employees, consumers,
and policy-holders usually have neither access to information nor the
bargaining power to protect themselves from oppressive forum selec-
tion agreements.
Another approach can be found in a statute passed recently by the
state of New York. That statute endorses forum selection agreements,
but only if they "aris[e] out of a transaction covering in the aggregate,
not less than one million dollars. '331 Other countries also recognize
that forum clauses are inappropriate in relatively small transactions.3 3 8
This recognizes that if the transaction is too small, the relative costs of
obtaining information about forum selection agreements are
prohibitive.
Other approaches are also possible. The Italian Civil Code requires
parties, under some circumstances, to separately sign forum clauses.339
The separate initial requirement is also employed in the United States
for other onerous provisions contained in form contracts.34°
There are advantages and disadvantages to each of these
approaches, but two types of protection commend themselves. One is
the categorical exclusions for consumer, insurance and employment
contracts found in the Brussels Convention, the FAA and elsewhere.
As noted above, it is unlikely that both parties to such a transaction
have access to information for meaningful evaluation of the forum
clauses. Accordingly, the justifications for enforcement break down.
Thus Sections 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(3) adopt these enforcement exclusions.
The other is the "amount of the transaction" standard employed in the
New York statute and elsewhere. This recognizes that below a certain
point access to information regarding technical matters, such as forum
333. Brussels Convention, supra note 23, art. 12.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. IM. art. 15.
337. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 1989).
338. Schwind, supra note 23, at 169 (Brazilian law).
339. Perillo, supra note 1, at 165.
340. See, eg., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-34-7 (Supp. 1990) (requires separate notification and




clauses, is prohibitively high in relation to the value of the contract.
Thus, section 8(a)(1) forbids enforcement of any forum clause that
arises out of a transaction with a value in the aggregate of less than
$50,000.00. The separate initial approach employed for some con-
tracts has the difficulty that it does not get to the root of the problem.
Although it may have the effect of putting the contracting party on
better notice as to the existence of the forum clause, it does nothing to
solve the problems of lack of information and the prohibitive costs of
obtaining the information.
There are other exceptions to enforcement in section 8, all of which
are less controversial. Section 8(a)(4) preserves the standard contract
defenses of fraud, duress, mistake and coercion, and incorporates in
section 1(i) the standard commercial law definitions of these terms.
Section 8(a)(4) also preserves the requirement that the fraud, duress,
coercion or mistake run directly to the clause itself. This recognizes
the fact that allowing a defense of fraud as to the whole agreement is
intertwined with the merits of the case, and would allow any party to
effectively block enforcement of the forum clause simply by alleging
fraud.
Section 8(a)(5) preserves the "changed character of the forum"
defense recognized in case law.341 This recognizes that, as a matter of
elementary fairness, a party should not be held to a bargain with
adverse consequences beyond the scope of foreseeability. Contract law
has long recognized similar principles,342 and there is no reason that
this justification should not be applicable here.
Section 8(a)(6) precludes enforcement if the forum clause is inten-
tionally buried in the memorial of the agreement. Thus, if the forum
clause is substantially less conspicuous than the other terms of the
agreement, the forum clause is void. This preserves the duty of a party
to read the contract, but refuses to allow one party to hide the forum
clause.
Section 8(c) allows parties to modify forum agreements. Because
the proposed statute requires that any forum agreement be in writing,
it also requires modification in writing.
Two notable absences are the lack of any generalized unfairness pro-
vision or a provision that an agreement designating an inconvenient
forum will not be recognized. The drafters of the Model Choice of
341. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
342. See, eg., RErATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 263 (1981).
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Forum Act employed such provisions in that statute; 43 however, a
variety of factors make these escape hatches unnecessary and unwise
here. First, the Model Choice of Forum Act, unlike the proposed stat-
ute, did not employ any categorical exemptions. 3" This absence, of
course, necessitated the use of some sort of escape route to avoid the
oppressive use of forum selection agreements. As the Brussels Con-
vention demonstrates, categorical exemptions, if chosen wisely, can
obviate the need for any generalized exceptions to enforcement. Sec-
ond, generalized exceptions come at the expense of predictability and
certainty. The greatest drawback to the Bremen principles was that
they led to inconsistent application. Codifying such an approach can
only lead to the same result. Finally, generalized exceptions invest a
great deal of confidence in the wise exercise of judicial discretion,
which, as argued above,3 45 is misplaced. Thus, instead of employing
any such generalized exceptions, the proposed statute employs cate-
gorical exemptions, and section 8(b) makes clear that these are the
exclusive exemptions.
5. Procedural Matters
The proposed statute also endeavors to clear up some confusion
over various details of the procedure for enforcing forum selection
agreements. The odd variety of procedural devices currently
employed to enforce forum selection agreements has led to some doubt
as to the point in time at which a party seeking to enforce a forum
selection agreement must move to enforce before waiving his rights.
Some cases have taken the position that such a motion can be made as
late as immediately prior to the start of trial,346 wlrle others have con-
cluded that any motion to enforce must be made immediately.347 Con-
sistent with the general federal policy of requiring defenses of
jurisdiction and venue to be raised immediately in order to avoid
unfairness to litigants, 348 section 9(a) of the proposed statute requires a
party to raise the matter in its responsive pleading.
Consistent with prompt and economical resolution of the matter,
the proposed statute requires early consideration of the forum selec-
343. MODEL CHOICE OF FORUM Acr (1968), reprinted in 17 Am. J. COMP. L. 292, at 295
(1969).
344. Id. at 292.
345. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
346. Cf. Chantier Naval Voisin v. M/Y Daybreak, 677 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(waiver by failure to present at the start of trial); Avant Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas, 652
F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1988).
347. See, eg., Queen Noor, Inc. v. McGinn, 578 F. Supp. 218 (SD. Tex. 1984).




tion agreement. Thus, section 9(a) requires a party to put forward its
evidence in support of enforcement when the issue is raised, and sec-
tion 9(b) allows any party opposing the motion to submit documen-
tary evidence to the contrary. Section 9(e) generally prohibits the use
of extrinsic evidence, 4 9 except in the case of attempting to demon-
strate an exception to enforcement, as these matters usually demand
proof in the form of extrinsic evidence. Section 9(d) requires the Dis-
trict Court to resolve the matter on the basis of documentary evidence,
unless there is a material issue of fact that requires live testimony.
Also consistent with treating the forum selection agreement as a
threshold issue, section 9(d) stays discovery on all issues other than
the forum selection agreement.
Finally, section 9(f) of the proposed statute overrules the Supreme
Court's decision in Lauro Lines, S.R.L. v. Chasser, 110 and allows inter-
locutory appeals from both orders granting and denying enforcement.
As noted above,"' the hit-and-miss appealability of orders on forum
selection agreements and orders on transfer motions has contributed
to uneven enforcement. The limited record generated at this early
stage of the proceedings prevents the appeals from being too burden-
some either for courts or litigants.
V. CONCLUSION
After decades of hostility towards forum selection agreements,
American acceptance of forum agreements had a promising start in
Bremen. Bremen adopted a standard of basic fairness for enforcement.
Although this indeterminate standard left a large amount of room for
judicial discretion, it worked acceptably well because it recognized
that the freedom of contract rationale for enforcing forum selection
agreements broke down when the transaction was small or the parties
lacked access to information to evaluate the value of the forum agree-
ment. Two recent Supreme Court decisions have considerably wors-
ened the state of affairs. In Stewart the Court muddied the waters as
to those matters in which the Bremen principles applied, and created a
dual standard that depended upon the procedural mechanism that the
party seeking to enforce the agreement employed. More recently, in
Carnival Cruise, the Supreme Court contorted the fundamental fair-
349. See City of N.Y. v. Pullman, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (extrinsic evidence
not admissible).
350. 490 U.S. 495 (1989).
351. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
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ness standard of Bremen in such a way as to validate nearly all con-
ceivable forum agreements, no matter how unfair or adhesive.
A comprehensive statute that regulates forum selection agreements
in all federal court cases, notwithstanding the basis for subject matter
jurisdiction, would resolve the existing confusion. Uniform standards
will promote certainty and litigant fairness and re3olve the problems
created by Stewart. The proposed statute generally respects enforce-
ment of forum agreements, but, following other efforts, such as the
Brussels Convention and the FAA, creates categorical exemptions for
employment contracts, individual insurance contracts, consumer con-
tracts, and forum agreements in which the aggregate consideration for
the transaction is less than $50,000.00. The proposed statute also cre-
ates efficient and unitary procedures for enforcement, thus eliminating







As used in this Act, the following definitions apply:
(a) "Forum selection agreement" means any agreement evidenced by
a writing to resolve, litigate, mediate or otherwise dispose of any
dispute in any forum, except that "forum selection agreement"
does not mean any agreement to arbitrate and does not mean any
agreement to allow confession of judgment or similar agreement.
(b) "Forum" means any state court, federal court, court of a foreign
nation, administrative body or any other entity or body empow-
ered to resolve disputes, but does not mean any arbitrator or arbi-
tration panel.
(c) "Party" or "parties" mean any party or parties to a forum selec-
tion agreement as defined by subsection (a) of this section.
(d) "The action" means any dispute or claim between the parties
which is encompassed by the forum selection agreement, and,
unless the forum selection agreement specifically provides other-
wise, any other dispute or claim between the parties that has a
common nucleus of operative fact with any dispute or claim
encompassed by the forum selection agreement.
(e) "The district court" means the United States district court in
which the action is filed or to which the action is removed from a
state court.
(f) "Exclusive forum selection agreement" means any forum selection
agreement that precludes the parties from proceeding on the
action before any forum other than the forum or fora before which
the parties agreed to proceed.
(g) "Non-exclusive forum selection agreement" means any forum
selection agreement that is not an exclusive forumi selection
agreement.
(h) In the case of an exclusive forum selection agreement, "proper
forum" means the forum or fora before which the parties agreed
to proceed in the forum selection agreement, as interpreted in
accordance with section 3 of this Act. In the case of a non-exclu-
sive forum selection agreement, "proper forum" means the forum
or fora before which the parties agreed to proceed in the forum
selection agreement, as interpreted in accordance with section 3 of
this Act, as well as any other forum which has subject matter and
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personal jurisdiction over the parties, and in which venue is
proper.
(i) "Fraud," "duress, .... coercion," and "mistake" are defined as
those terms are generally defined by principles of contract law
applicable in commercial transactions.
SECTION 2: Scope of Application and Enforcement: This Act applies to
any civil case in any United States district court in. which the district
court has obtained subject matter jurisdiction either as an original
matter or upon removal from a state court, except that it does not
apply to any action arising under the bankruptcy laws. Subject to the
terms, limitations, and exceptions of this Act, and in accordance with
the procedures set forth in this Act, any forum selection agreement
shall be enforced according to its terms. This Act is the exclusive
means of enforcing forum selection agreements.
SECTION 3: Construction and Interpretation:
(a) A forum selection agreement shall be given a reasonable interpre-
tation to effectuate its terms.
(b) In interpreting a forum selection agreement the district court shall
abide by the following provisions:
(1) Unless a forum selection agreement clearly provides otherwise,
a forum selection agreement shall be interpreted to be an exclusive
forum selection agreement.
(2) Unless a forum selection agreement clearly provides otherwise,
a reference to a geographical area or political entity shall be inter-
preted as a reference to all fora having subject matter jurisdiction over
the action within that geographical area or political entity.
(3) In the event that there is no proper forum with subject matter
jurisdiction over the entire action, a forum selection agreement shall
be interpreted to require that the parties proceed before a reasonable
alternative forum having subject matter jurisdiction over the entire
action and within reasonable geographical proximity to a proper
forum. In the event that there is no reasonable alternative forum with
subject matter jurisdiction over the entire action, a forum selection
agreement shall be interpreted to allow prosecution of the action in
more than one forum in the manner most reasonable under the
circumstances.
SECTION 4: Effect on Non-Parties: Only parties may enforce and be
bound by a forum selection agreement, except that non-parties may
enforce and be bound by a forum selection agreement in a manner
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consistent with general principles of contract law applicable in com-
mercial transactions and consistent with this Act. With regard to per-
sons or entities that are not parties and are not otherwise bound by a
forum selection agreement, nothing in this Act modifies or limits the
power of the district court to dismiss or transfer such persons or enti-
ties for reasons other than the forum selection agreement.
SECTION 5: Choice-of-law Provisions: This Act applies notwithstand-
ing any agreement of the parties with regard to the law governing the
action. Nothing in this Act modifies or limits the power of parties to
agree to the law governing the action with regard to matters other
than the enforcement of a forum selection agreement.
SECTION 6: Mechanism for Enforcement:
(a) If the district court is a proper forum, the district court shall pro-
ceed with the action and shall neither dismiss the action for reason
of defect of venue or lack of personal jurisdiction, nor shall the
district court transfer the action to any other district court that is
not a proper forum. Nothing in this subsection limits or modifies
the power of the district court to transfer the action, pursuant to
section 1404 of Title 28 of the United States Code, to another dis-
trict court that is a proper forum.
(b) If the district court is not a proper forum, the district court shall
proceed as provided for in this subsection; if:
(1) the action was removed from a state court that is a proper
forum, the district court shall remand the action to the state court;
(2) the action was brought originally in the district court, or was
removed from a state court that is not a proper forum, and one or
more district courts other than the district court are proper fora, the
district court shall transfer the action, in the manner provided for
under sections 1404 and 1406 of Title 28 of the United States Code, to
one of those district courts that is a proper forum. The transferee dis-
trict court shall determine the law applicable to the action as if the
action had been filed originally in the transferee district court;
(3) or, the action was brought originally in the district court, or was
removed from a state court that is not a proper forum, and no other
district court is a proper forum, the action shall be dismissed in the
manner provided for in section 7.
SECTION 7: Procedure on Dismissal. In the event that the district
court is required to dismiss the action under section 6(b)(3), the dis-
trict court may condition the dismissal upon such terms as are just,
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including, but not limited to, requiring the moving party to waive any
defense of limitation upon refiling in a proper forum, preserving any
attachment obtained in the district court to secure any final judgment
obtained upon refiling in a proper forum against the moving party, and
requiring the moving party to accept service upon refiling in a proper
forum in a reasonable manner.
SECTION 8: Exceptions:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Act a forum selection
agreement is not enforceable if-
(1) the forum selection agreement arises out of a transaction in
which the consideration is, in the aggregate, less than $50,000.00;
(2) the forum selection agreement arises out a contract for the
employment of an individual, unless the forum selection agreement is
entered into after the dispute has arisen between the parties;
(3) the forum selection agreement arises out of a contract with an
individual, not within the scope of that individual's trade or business,
for insurance, or for the purchase of goods and services, unless the
forum selection agreement is entered into after the dispute has arisen
between the parties;
(4) the forum selection agreement itself was the product of fraud,
duress, mistake or coercion;
(5) due to unforeseeable events or circumstances beyond the control
of the party seeking to avoid enforcement of the forum selection agree-
ment, the proper forum or fora have changed in character so as to
make it substantially unjust to require the party seeking to avoid
enforcement of the forum agreement to submit to the proper forum or
fora;
(6) or, the forum selection agreement is part of a larger agreement
and the forum selection agreement is substantially less conspicuous
than a substantial portion of the other terms within the written memo-
rial of that larger agreement.
(b) The exceptions to enforcement under subsections (a)(1) through
(a)(6) of this section constitute the exclusive exceptions to enforce-
ment of forum selection agreements.
(c) This Act does not prevent the parties from mutually modifying or
rescinding any forum selection agreement, provided that any mod-




SECTION 9: Procedures Before the District Court:
(a) Within the time required to file a responsive pleading before the
district court, and prior to, or contemporaneously with, the filing
any other responsive pleading, a party before the district court
wishing to enforce a forum selection agreement shall move under
this section to enforce the agreement. Failure to make a timely
motion under this section waives that party's right to seek to
enforce the forum selection agreement. The motion shall be
accompanied by an authenticated copy of the forum selection
agreement, any affidavits and any other documentary evidence
that the party seeking to enforce the agreement may wish to sub-
mit, and shall set forth with particularity the relief sought under
this Act.
(b) Any other party before the district court may oppose the motion
and may present evidence in documentary form with such
opposition.
(c) The party seeking enforcement of the forum selection agreement
has the burdens of production and persuasion on all matters
except for the existence of exceptions to enforcement under section
8 of this Act; as to those exceptions, the burdens of production and
persuasion rest with the party resisting enforcement.
(d) The district court shall rule on the motion on the basis of the evi-
dence submitted with the motion and the opposition, unless the
district court determines that there is a disputed issue or issues of
material fact. In the event that there is a disputed issue or issues
of material fact the district court shall conduct a hearing to con-
sider live testimony on the issue or issues. The district court may,
in its discretion, allow the parties to conduct limited discovery
with regard to the disputed issue or issues of material fact, but
shall otherwise stay discovery until it rules on the motion.
(e) In no instance shall extrinsic evidence be admissible to demon-
strate or explain any ambiguity or unclarity in the forum selection
agreement; however, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show the
applicability or non-applicability of any exception to enforcement
under section 8 of this Act.
(f) Any order granting or denying a motion under this section shall
be immediately appealable. The district court shall have discre-
tion to stay its order pending any appeal from any order on
motions under this section.
